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Is Power-Sharing a Solution to Africa’s Conflicts?

Katabaro Miti, Ella Abatan and Stephanie Minou
University of Pretoria

Introduction
Power-sharing has been widely used in Africa over the past two decades as a formula for managing political conflicts and crises. Such inclusive government has been attempted in some form in countries like: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros Islands, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe (Mitchell 2012, 172). It has become popular to the extent that discussions of potential power-sharing arrangements are carried out even before elections that are expected to be controversial are conducted. This was the case in the 2011 polls in Uganda (Cheeseman 2011, 337). But despite its popularity as a conflict resolution instrument, its effectiveness is questionable. In reviewing recent African cases of peace settlements from 1999 to 2007, Mehler (2009, 453) came to the conclusion that “although power sharing was a prominent aspect in most of these peace settlements, the relationship between peace and power sharing has not been so obvious as only a few of these agreements could be classified as successes”. In fact, most countries that have used power-sharing to resolve their conflicts have not achieved any long lasting stability nor have they been able to establish a credible system of multiparty politics. This article seeks to explain why a method of conflict resolution so appealing in theory has failed so often in practice by outlining the different challenges that power-sharing faces on the African continent. In order to effectively do so it is important to have a clear understanding of power-sharing and its different dimensions and the theories behind the practice.

Defining Power-Sharing
Power-sharing has been defined “set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant identity group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group” (Traniello 2008, 31). It basically means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision-making at the level of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the army. The aim of power-sharing is therefore to reduce majoritarianism by reducing the danger that one party or ethnic group becomes dominant and threatens the security of others (Papagianni 2009, 24; Cheeseman 2011, 339). Underlying these definitions is the existence of competing groups, regarded in Africa as ethnic groups and elsewhere as elites.
Power-sharing is an arrangement through which these groups manage their differences. These arrangements can and have taken place at four levels: political, territorial, military and economic.

At the political level, power-sharing involves a unity government that draws members from different groups. It refers to the allocation of specific posts in government or specific proportions in the executive, legislature, or judiciary to different groups (Sriram and Zahar 2009, 17). In the context of open conflict, power-sharing means the allocation of positions to the different warring groups. This has been the most common element in the settlement of African conflicts. This is illustrated by the case of Zimbabwe provided in this journal.

At the territorial level, power-sharing has historically been used to address the self-determination demands of minorities that are both ethnically, linguistically or religiously distinct from the rest of the country and geographically concentrated (Sriram and Zahar 2009: 17; DeRouen 2008: 1547). It provides some form of autonomy to specific groups within a national or federal government framework. The arrangement in the Comoros represents such territorial power-sharing.

Military power-sharing implies first the sharing of command posts within the army and the determination of the numbers of soldiers to be integrated in the newly constituted national army. The best example of this is Burundi where the 2003 settlement signed in Pretoria (South Africa) by the transitional government of Burundi and the main rebel group, the CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie – Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie) contained provisions for an integrated general staff and officer corps composed of sixty per cent officers selected from the government army and forty per cent from the FDD, and the allocation of command posts on the basis of ethnic balance (fifty-fifty) (Mehler 2009, 458; Falch and Becker 2008).

Economic power-sharing involves the distribution of state resources between the different regions. It is often used when specific areas feel that they have not equally benefited from the existing distribution of state budgets. An example of this is the peace settlement signed in April 1999 in Antananarivo between representatives of Moheli and Grande Comore (two of the Comoros' main islands) which included an equitable sharing of resources between the islands and the central government (Mehler 2009, 459). With the growth in oil and other mineral production on the continent one should expect a greater focus on economic power-sharing arrangements between the producing areas and the central government. The 2005 Comprehensive Agreement between North and South Sudan included an economic power-sharing arrangement of the oil revenue.

**Models of Power-Sharing**

Power-sharing arrangements to date have been premised on three different models: consociational, incentive and tri-polar. The consociational model can be traced back to Arthur Lewis who in 1965 published *Politics in West Africa*. In this study he pointed to the impracticability of democracy in plural societies. For him plural societies are divided by tribal, religious, linguistic, cultural and regional differences. The best way to govern these societies that
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These societies are predominantly found in the colonized territories of Africa, Asia and Latin America is through the formation of coalition governments (Orji 2008, 21-22). These societies are completely different from the European class societies on which democracy is based.

Using Lewis’ ideas, Arend Lijphart (1977) went on to develop his consociational model as an institutionalized form of democratic conflict management for divided societies (Jarstad 2009, 45). The model focuses on elite cooperation and identifies four features: Executive power-sharing, where each of the main groups shares in executive power in a grand coalition government to ensure the participation of all leaders; distribution using the proportionality principle of offices and revenue; autonomy or self-government for each group and; the existence of veto rights, that would enable each group to prevent changes that adversely affect their vital interests (Orji 2008, 21; Spears 2000, 107; Traniello 2008, 31). This elite-based model particularly with its autonomy/self-government and veto rights has not found favor in African countries seeking to create strong and unified states. It has, however, been the basis of political power-sharing arrangements, in particular the distribution of executive offices.

The incentivist model is based on Donald Horowitz’s (1985) argument that consociationalism fails to highlight the incentives for elite cooperation and inter-group accommodations. He calls for the creation of a federal system with special voting arrangements. He proposed the creation of ethnically homogenous states where groups are territorially concentrated; but, where groups are intermixed, he advocates for the creation of ethnically heterogenous states. His argument is that such heterogeneous states will encourage elites from different ethnic background to intermingle at the state level, which in turn will ease ethnic hostilities at the national level. Furthermore a heterogeneous state will provide groups that are minority at the federal level the opportunity to become majority in one or more states, thereby compensating for their marginal influence at the federal level (Orji 2008, 25-30; Spears 202, 125-127). With respect to the electoral system, he advocates for a vote pooling arrangement. This is an exchange of votes by politicians of their respective supports to achieve victory (Orji 2008, 27). To secure pooled votes, he argues, politicians must behave moderately on issues that generate inter-group disagreement. Like the consociational model, the incentivist model with its federalism and creation of mini states has not found favor on the continent. But the issue of incentives has been taken on board and forms the reason for extending participation in the power-sharing arrangements of all rebel and non-rebel groups.

The tri-polar model was intended by Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (2003) to broaden the scope of power-sharing beyond the political dimension to include territorial, economic and security dimensions. These are seen as having significance equal to, or greater than, the political dimensions and that they are likely to guarantee stability.

None of the three models really provide a proper justification for the power-sharing arrangements that have been taking place on the continent. Power-sharing has, however, emerged as the preferred route of conflict resolution on the continent. There are clear challenges and limitations both in the negotiation and implementation of power-sharing arrangements that require noting here.
The Challenges of Power-Sharing in Africa

It is clear, for example, that the success or failure of power-sharing arrangements is dependent on the existence of specific conditions, that is, the balance of power between the warring groups and the resources available to them. In the absence of external pressures to force the political opponents to join forces or to demonstrate their collective solidarity, negotiations for power-sharing and the implementation of the agreements reached can be difficult and tenuous.

Power-sharing arrangements are designed to achieve a set of immediate security demands in the short-term. The goal is that of negative peace; halting current fighting and limiting the risks of its return. But even these short-term goals of power-sharing at times prove difficult to achieve, both in reaching an agreement, and, even more so, in the implementation of an agreement that has been reached (Sriram and Zahar 2009, 20-21; Totolo 2009, 2-3). The difficulty in reaching an agreement stems from the fact that the conflicting parties have very different (and conflicting) interests and agendas. For example, groups that value territorial autonomy and governance of resources might not be interested in signing an agreement that offers them participation in national security forces or in parliament. This was the case with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), who had no apparent interest in being included in the security forces but clearly articulated demands for power and resource-sharing (Sriram and Zahar 2009, 22-23; Traniello 2008, 28-29).

Negotiations have frequently had to deal with ‘spoilers’, that is, those who are not actually interested in furthering a peace process. Some of these have the capacity and the will to resort to violence to subvert peace processes (Gates & Strom 2008, 3). This has often led to a vexing issue of who should be included or excluded from the peace process. The accommodation of potential spoilers has resulted in ever growing costs and the extension of negotiating periods, not to mention difficulties in reaching an agreement. Since funding for such negotiations is typically raised externally, periods in which negotiations had to be abandoned until sufficient funding could be raised are not uncommon.

It is one thing to reach an agreement and another to implement it. Agreements have often been violated by signatories because the incentives contained in the agreement were not important to them or they felt that they could achieve their goals through violence. In Zimbabwe, for example, in spite of the power-sharing deal between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), senior ZANU-PF officials have undermined the implementation of the power-sharing agreement reached, by using both violent and non-violent means. This included the arrest of MDC ministerial nominees along with the detention, and torture of human rights activists and MDC sympathizers.

Implementation problems have further arisen because parties have committed themselves to short-term pragmatism rather than long-term policies. Parties committing themselves to a power-sharing agreement may do so for cynical or short-term ends, and will eventually seek to obtain absolute power. This may particularly be the case if power-sharing is viewed as imported
or externally imposed. This was the case with the DPA Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006, where the conflicting parties signed the peace agreement knowing full well that the battlefield was the real strategic arena of conflict and that the negotiations were simply tactical maneuvering (Nathan 2008).

Furthermore, agreements do not dispel old patterns of mistrust and cheating. These are sometimes transported into the new partnership institutions of governance. In Sudan for instance, many of the institutions alluded to in the peace agreement to ensure implementation of specific governance incentives, such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), were not established, or were highly dysfunctional because of the existing mistrust. The end result is the revival of tensions or even conflict; which then lead to the collapse of the peace agreement (Sriram and Zahar 2009, 24-25).

Finally, the implementation of power-sharing may be difficult if not impossible in 'bad' neighborhoods. Neighboring states that have an interest in the continuation of a conflict may foster, but also have the power to destabilize, power-sharing in multiple ways. This is most probable in situations where geostrategic interests or ethnic kinship considerations draw neighboring states into the politics of the state's implementation of power-sharing agreements (Sriram and Zahar 2009, 27-28). This has been the case in the DRC where both Rwanda and Uganda had specific interests in keeping the conflict alive.

Apart from the problems with the implementation process of power-sharing arrangements, some have produced negative results, even where they had been deemed successful in ushering in a transition from war to peace. They have in some instances created states that were unable to effectively respond to governance challenges. By inserting insurgents into various levels of governance and turning warlords into government officials based on their former coercive roles, power-sharing institutions are in many instances incapable of winning public confidence and securing long-term legitimacy. Instead, they often create incentive structures for would-be-leaders, who can attempt to seize a portion of power by embarking on the insurgent path. The rebel becomes an appealing option in the pursuit of otherwise blocked political aspiration (Tull & Mehler 2005, 376; Mitchell 2012, 175). This in turn might lead to the creation of new grievances, and the risk of importing conflict behavior into weak state institutions. Power-sharing agreements at times include participants who lack the background and capacity to function properly in positions responsible for public policy (Traniello 2008, 28-29). This undermines the building of a strong and sustainable state as it places power on individuals and groups not fully committed to, or unable to take part in governance for the benefit of the entire population.

Power-sharing has further been used by incumbent governments as mechanisms for blocking reforms. This has been the case in situations where power-sharing arose out of electoral defeats of the incumbent as has been the case in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Cheeseman & Tendi 2010, 204; Mitchell 2012, 175). Incumbent governments that had refused to recognize their electoral defeat agreed to enter into unity government because it enabled them to remain in power. They believed that as long as they retained a portion of the presidential power, it would be easier for them to
‘effectively veto reform’ by not implementing the clauses of the agreements, which were most problematic for them (Cheeseman & Tendi 2010, 219). In these instances, power-sharing, rather than creating a space for reform coalitions, can be manipulated by incumbents, desperate to retain their positions in the face of electoral defeat. In this regard, not only do power-sharing arrangements freeze the war-time realities and prevent politics from evolving, but they also concentrate power in the hands of war-time elites and fail to create adequate political space for the expression of other interests (Cheeseman & Tendi 2010, 219; Mitchell 2012, 175).

Lastly, power-sharing counters the very basic principle of democracy. Whereas in a democratic regime citizens are sovereign and have electoral decisions that matter, under power-sharing arrangements, the significance of elections is limited, as the government will consist of a broad coalition of groups, regardless of the outcome of the voting (Gates & Strom 2008, 2). In post-elections crises therefore, power-sharing sets a precedent for anti-democratic behavior, as it enables authoritarian leaders to maintain the benefits of incumbency which will no doubt be wielded with added ferocity in future elections (Cheeseman & Tendi 2010, 225). As such, power-sharing seems to be a generous title for a process which has condemned opposition parties to accept inferior positions within the government, despite their success at the ballot box.

**Conclusion**

Despite the multiple challenges arising from the negotiation and implementation of power-sharing arrangements in Africa, it has remained a dynamic and attractive option for resolving the multitude of protracted conflicts on the continent. It remains an appealing means of conflict resolution to external policymakers, even if it drastically underestimates the complexity of the conflicts and the intransigence of the respective leaderships. The short-term peace and stability that it provides is welcome. In a situation where there appears to be a general lack of mechanisms for bringing about peace, power-sharing appears to one of few viable options. It is, however, likely to succeed only where there is a genuine desire and commitment among the respective leaders towards peace, and sufficient imagination and innovation to create appropriate structures and institutions which simultaneously accommodate all groups. It must be driven by the spirit of reconciliation among the warring parties. It also calls for changes in the electoral processes dominated by a winner-takes-all political mentality and the perception of the control of the state as a prize to be won rather than as one to be shared.

Furthermore, power-sharing should be seen as a temporary measure – a transitional system that leads to a political system based on norms of trust and cooperation. The transitional period should be utilized to work out long-lasting constitutional agreements to govern the country. As a transitional process leading to elections and a new constitution, power-sharing should ideally create a political space for debate to take place outside the power-sharing arrangements in order to facilitate the emergence of new leaders and the strengthening of civil society.
References


**Biographical Note**

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The Government of National Unity as a Transitional Power-Sharing Institution in Madagascar

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Abstract
The Government of National Unity in Madagascar was part of the transitional plan negotiated in Maputo and later also adopted in the SADC Roadmap. No explicit arguments were used in the negotiations to justify such a government but it was possibly influenced by the precedents set by several other African countries. The unity government in Madagascar, the same as most similar governments, cannot be expected to be a general ‘success’ or without periodic crises. In Madagascar it was arguably also used to disguise SADC’s acceptance of the coup leader, Andry Rajoelina, as the transitional president though it was against the African approach to unconstitutional changes of government. Seven phases or cycles were identified during the GNU rule in Madagascar: they ranged from the initial negotiations to establish the government to Rajoelina’s unilateral actions, amendments of the Roadmap, suspension of participation by some opposition groups and ultimately focus on the elections.

Introduction
The concept of a government of national unity is not new. It is most of the time associated with the ideal of power-sharing in the form of an over-sized coalition. In deeply-divided ethnic societies it is sometimes used as one of the elements of a consociational democracy, like the one in Switzerland and earlier in Cyprus, Lebanon, the Netherlands and Belgium. In the context of post-conflict and transitional situations it is often utilized as an instrument of confidence-building and stabilization of a political situation. Madagascar serves as an example of the latter use of a GNU.

The consociational form of a GNU is normally constitutionally entrenched and therefore designed to be used for the long-term. The transitional use of it, on the other hand, is normally temporary in duration, and often part of a peace agreement but not necessarily constitutionally codified.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) also distinguishes between a group-building approach and an integrative approach to power-sharing. The former is consociational in nature and is premised on ethnically homogenous parties as participants, while the latter seeks to build political coalitions of any nature, to create incentives for political leaders to be moderate and to allow for minority influence in decision-making (Harris 1998, 140-141). Arguably, the unity government in Madagascar was expected to follow the integrative approach.

Power-Sharing, Transitions and Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Power-sharing in unity governments as a constitutional framework for ethnically-diverse societies are well-researched (Lijphart, Horowitz). Yet less attention has been given to power-
sharing in such societies as part of a peace process. Timothy D. Sisk (1997) is an exception in this regard and he concentrated on the motivation for such arrangements. In brief, he emphasized the structure and operation of incentives for political leaders in periods of rapid political change as well as realization of a common or shared destiny (Sisk 1997, 78-79) as the main motivations.

The use of unity governments and power-sharing institutions less defined by overtly ethnic identities and more by other identities is much less researched and theorized. Madagascar falls into this category. No source is available that explicitly explains the arguments used in the negotiations pertaining to why the parties decided to include a unity government in the Malagasy transition. Former Pres. Ravalomanana (personal interview, 1 February 2013, Hartebeespoort Dam) also could not recall a specific discussion during the negotiations about a rationale for its inclusion. The precedent set by South Africa, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and others was possibly sufficient as a motivation for the Malagasy political movements to embrace it without much debate.

Conceptually, a unity government is designed to incorporate diverse political interests, including the main antagonists in the preceding conflict. In this sense it is meant to compel them into political cooperation. For the public at large it is meant to serve as a practical and symbolic form of reconciliation. For the antagonists it is designed as a period during which they can learn to know each other better, to reduce the negative stereotypes about each other and to increase the level of trust in each other (i.e trust and confidence-building). It is not realistic to expect that they will become allies during the transitional period but rather that the minimum level of trust necessary for any functioning political system should emerge. A unity government should also include the potential spoilers – a concept developed by Stephen Stedman and others. Inclusion in government is expected to reduce their potential to spoil or sabotage the transition. Furthermore, a unity government should include smaller but significant political formations. One of the purposes of a transition is to cultivate a broad consensus about the future direction of political and constitutional development in a country. Politics should not be conducted as a zero-sum competition and therefore small political formations should not feel marginalized during the transition.

An important consociational principle often incorporated also in a transitional unity government is proportionality. It is potentially problematic if one participant or an alliance of participants enjoys an absolute majority of support and therefore has a majority of seats in government. The essential requirement of sharing of power in a unity government is then under pressure. Related to this, the required majorities for decision-making are often contested between efforts to entrench consensual decision-making in power-sharing and the perceived threat of unilateral actions. Power-sharing is an exceptionally difficult principle to implement, because it does not only affect decision-making procedures and sharing of seats in government, but also sharing of appointments of senior government officials and determining which ministerial portfolio should go to which party.

Any expectation that a GNU will be a general ‘success’ or will operate without periodic crises is unrealistic. A unity government’s main objectives are normally limited to containing the levels of political violence and conflict, to stabilize the political situation, to prepare for an election and quite often also to draft a new constitution that is finalized by a general referendum.

The case of Madagascar added an additional objective for the use of a GNU, which is relatively unique. When the Ravalomanana administration was overtaken by the military and Rajoelina regime in March 2009, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) immediately responded by declaring it an unconstitutional change of government in
terms of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), and suspending its membership from the two organizations (SADC 2009) (Africa News 2009) (SouthAfrica.info 2009). The unconstitutional nature of the events was, arguably, premeditated because already before the coup Andry Rajoelina presented himself as an alternative transitional authority. After the military handed him the presidential powers, that authority was formalized and he became known as “la Président de la Haute Autorité de la Transition” (HAT). This Authority did not enjoy any international recognition or legitimacy, yet SADC responded with a mediation process in 2009 which included the Mouvance Rajoelina as one of the four main participants. Arguably, the only means of hiding its ostensible embarrassment for granting official participatory status to the coup leaders was to devise a unity government in which Rajoelina would be counterbalanced by the other political stakeholders. It did not take into account the possibility that Rajoelina could continue indefinitely as transitional President and dominate the situation in the absence of Marc Ravalomanana, who was kept in exile in South Africa. In spite of the agreements’ formulations, in which a unity government was agreed upon, it is suggested that SADC’s primary intention was not to incorporate the main antagonists, to build trust amongst them or to promote cooperation between them. Instead, the unity government was an enlarged government, incorporating (or even coopting) other political movements as a means to reduce the obvious illegitimacy of the Rajoelina regime. This suggestion of the GNU’s rationale in Madagascar has not been articulated by anyone in public and therefore it is a matter of interpretation here. Later it will be mentioned that the Mouvance Ravalomanana decided to suspend participation by its members in the GNU and other transitional institutions in May 2012, partly on the basis of its perceived cooptation into a Rajoelina-dominated dispensation and exploitation of their implied legitimisation function.

The Malagasy examples presents one of the most difficult problems for any unity government: it has to be inclusive and has to build bridges between the antagonists, but how does it avoid rewarding forces involved in unconstitutional activities like rebels or military coup leaders for their activities by including them in the government?

In conclusion, a unity government has become one of the standard elements in most of the peace processes mediated by the AU or its regional organisations. If it is not assessed in over-ambitious terms it can make an important contribution to a transition and the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction. It should be assessed as a temporary measure and as a political anachronism that cannot be expected to function as a conventional coalition government.

**Government Cycles in Madagascar Since 2009**

The Malagasy executive system is semi-presidential in nature, resembling the French dispensation. A directly-elected executive President is assisted by a Prime Minister whose constituency is based on parliamentary support and who acts as the leader of government. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who in turn identifies the ministers although they are appointed by the President. Theoretically the possibility of cohabitation does exist when the President’s party and the majority party in parliament differ. This executive system was also the basis of the different versions of a unity government applied in Madagascar since 2009.

One of the most important features of the Malagasy unity government is that it went through different phases or cycles, which is unusual. The first phase was not by design a unity government, but started in March 2009 when Rajoelina became the President of the HAT while he continued with Ravalomanana’s Prime Minister, Eugène Mangalaza.

The second phase was the SADC-led mediation that produced the Maputo Accords in August 2009 and the Addis Ababa Additional Act in November 2009. The Maputo agreement on a
“National Government of Unity of the Transition” is found in two documents: the “Accord politique de Maputo” and the “Charte de la Transition”. In these agreements a distinction was made between the President and Vice-President on the one hand, and the GNU consisting of a Prime Minister of Consensus, three Vice Prime Ministers and 28 Ministers (Accord politique de Maputo, le 8 août 2009, Article 4) (Charte de la Transition, le 9 août 2009, Article 3.1). In Addis Ababa the agreement on Vice-Presidents was replaced by two Co-Presidents (Acte Additionnel d’Addis Ababa a la Charte de la Transition Malgache, le 6 novembre 2007, Article 3).

In Maputo, agreement was reached about a list of other transitional institutions, all meant to incorporate the principles of neutrality, inclusivity, peace and consensus (Charte de la Transition, le 9 août 2009, Article 1). They were not directly part of the GNU but rather directly related to it. The most relevant ones were the two houses of parliament: “Le Conseil supérieur de la Transition” (65 members) and “Le Congrès de la Transition” (258 members), “La Haute Cour de la Transition”, “La Commission électorale nationale indépendante” and “La Conseil économique et social de la Transition”. The composition of all these institutions was based on equality and not proportionality. For example, the ministerial portfolios were allocated equally (i.e. six seats each) to the four mouvances (i.e. Rajoelina, Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana, Zafy) and seven to the “autres sensibilités”, referring to organisations of the Mouvance Rajoelina (Acte Additionnel d’Addis Ababa a la Charte de la Transition Malgache, le 6 novembre 2007, Article 10).

The significance of this phase was that it introduced a new transitional structure beyond the existing Constitution and it incorporated a high level of power-sharing amongst the four mouvances of former and incumbents Presidents. At Addis Ababa they identified the office-bearers of the new positions, namely President (Rajoelina), Co-Presidents (from the Mouvance Zafy and Ravalomanana), President of the Congress of the Transition (Mamy Rakotoarivelo of Mouvance Ravalomanana), President of the Upper Council of the Transition (Mouvance Rajoelina) and the Prime Minister (Mangalaza) (Acte Additionnel Article 9). It established a fine balance between the different stakeholders. But one characteristic dominated it: Rajoelina’s acceptance as transitional President thereby effectively condoned the coup while Ravalomanana remained in exile. Rakotoarivelo assumed the de facto internal leadership of the Mouvance Ravalomanana but only in the capacity of president of the lower house. The fundamental requirement of a GNU that all the main political players must be included was therefore not met.

The next phase commenced with Rajoelina’s presidential decree on 18 December 2009 in which he dismissed Mangalaza as Prime Minister and replaced him with Col. Albert Camille Vital. He also annulled his decree that ratified the Maputo and Addis Ababa agreements and called for a parliamentary election on 20 March 2010 (SABC News 2009) (BBC News 2009). It signaled the end of the first initiative to establish a unity government; it also introduced a unilateral style of government that characterized most of the transition, and it reintroduced the HAT.

A period of stasis followed. The SADC mediator, former President Joaquim Chissano, convened a meeting on 28-30 April 2010 in Pretoria of all four mouvances. In the communiqué afterwards an attempt was made to revive the first initiative: “In the course of the consultations, the movement leaders strongly expressed the view that the Maputo Agreements and the Additional Act of Addis Ababa, negotiated and signed by all the parties constitute, despite challenges faced in the implementation, a decisive gain in the process to end the crisis and an essential foundation for leading an inclusive, consensual transition, in the shortest time possible” (Pretoria communiqué on the Madagascar mediation initiative, 30 April 2010, Paragraph 7). Two weeks later the mediator reaffirmed the call when he issued a statement emphasizing that
“unilateralism is unacceptable” and that a “consensual and inclusive process” should be followed (Chissano, Statement by the Mediator [Joaquim Chissano] on the recent developments in Madagascar 2010).

At the same time, suggestions were made that a new “French roadmap” for the transition was in the pipeline. Rajoelina presented some elements of it already at the Pretoria consultation (personal interview with Marc Ravalomanana, 1 May 2010, Sandton) and therefore it emerged as the antithesis of the Maputo agreements. Most significant was the restriction on Ravalomanana’s return to Madagascar to only when the political and security situations would be conducive for it – therefore a conditional return or an indefinite delay.

The next phase was the emergence of the internal Malgacho-Malgache dialogue process, preparation of a new constitution and a referendum on 17 November 2010. This phase was characterized by excluding the mouvances from any negotiations or dialogue; structuring of a dialogue inside Madagascar amongst Rajoelina-aligned groups and unilaterally drafting a new constitution.

The Constitution of the 4th Republic created an Executive composed of the President (Article 44) while the Government consists of a Prime Minister and Ministers (Article 63). No reference is made to a unity government or a transition, except that the HAT will continue until the new President has been inaugurated (Madagascar-Tribune.com 2010, Pojet de constitution de la quatrième République, Article 166). The three opposition mouvances boycotted the referendum, which was interpreted as undermining the legitimacy Rajoelina sought for his regime (Guardian 2010). Pres. Ravalomanana issued a statement on 13 November 2010 in which he did not directly call for a boycott but appealed to the military and mayors to protect that country and urged them “to restore back [sic] the legal government respecting human rights, so that the People will trust you again. … For that, you should preserve the unity and respect the army and the republican values” (M. Ravalomanana, Statement of President Marc Ravalomanana, November 13, 2010)

The AU, SADC and international community did not accept the referendum which meant that the intention to conduct new presidential and parliamentary elections could not materialize. It also means that the Constitution as an alternative and unilateral initiative by Rajoelina to impose a new dispensation that ignored the transitional arrangements largely failed. In reality the HAT without a unity government continued but within a transitional lacuna.

The next phase was an alternative for the constitutional approach and produced the first Roadmap. It was signed on 9 March 2011 by eight parties, mainly Rajoelina’s TGV and others that constituted the “Rajoelina Platform”. Not one of the mouvances accepted it. A new Executive and Government were agreed upon in the Malgacho-Malgache dialogue: Andry Rajoelina as President of the Transition, a Prime Minister of Consensus appointed by the President from a list proposed by the Malagasy “Political Actors” who signed the Roadmap (paragraph 5) while the Political Actors were to nominate a list of personalities to the Prime Minister who would then propose the Government members to the President (paragraph 6) – in other words, a unity government was envisaged consisting only of the parties that signed the agreement, and thereby excluding the mouvances. It is informative that the Roadmap specified criteria for the unity government: the Prime Minister was not supposed to come from the same party or region as the President, allocation of portfolios must be just and equitable, it must respect their political origin, gender representation and regional presence. Very significant was paragraph 20, stating that Pres. Ravalomanana could not return to Madagascar before a favourable political and security environment was established (Feuille de Route la Sortie de
Crise à Madagascar – Engagements des Acteurs Politiques Malgaches, 9 mars 2011, Par. 20). This roadmap was in essence based on the French one formulated about a year earlier. By implication it accepted that the new Constitution lacked legitimacy or general acceptance and that a transitional government had to be established as an alternative. The mouvances’ opposition to a Rajoelina-dominated dispensation, however, worsened the legitimacy deficit and therefore the AU, SADC and international community did not amend their attitude towards Rajoelina – Madagascar remained suspended and sanctions continued.

The SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation met on 31 March 2011 in Livingstone, Zambia, and received a report from the official mediator, former Pres. Chissano. His report recommended that the Troika summit should endorse the Roadmap and that the UN, AU and wider international community should be requested to endorse it also (Chissano, Draft Report of the SADC Mediator [Joaquim Chissano] on the Madagascar Crisis – Rev. 3 – 29 March 2011, Par. 93). The summit’s response did not support the Chissano sentiment but paragraph 15 in the SADC Communiqué stated instead: “The Extraordinary Summit decided not to recognize Mr. Rajoelina as President of Madagascar as his appointment did not only violate the Constitution of Madagascar and democratic principles, but also violated the core principles and values of the SADC Treaty, the African Union Constitutive Act and the United Nations Charter”. While the summit “endorsed the report of the SADC Facilitation on Zimbabwe” it did not endorse the Chissano report and the Roadmap was merely “noted” (Personal letter, Pres. Marc Ravalomanana to Pres. Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia, April 28, 2011, 2). The mediation and transition were therefore effectively in a stalemate: the SADC Organ and its mediator maintained different sentiments about Rajoelina and his unilateral initiatives while the international community did not want to endorse the proposed transitional framework and instead condoned the mouvances’ opposition to it.

The SADC Roadmap
SADC initiated a major intervention to address the stalemate in the form of an extraordinary summit in Sandton, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 June 2011. A number of important decisions were taken that amounted to amendments to the Roadmap. In the Summit Communiqué the following was recorded:

14. Summit endorsed the Roadmap to bring Madagascar into constitutional normalcy presented by the SADC Mediator on Madagascar after affecting necessary amendments.
15. Summit urged the leaders of the Mouvances Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana and Zafy to initial the Roadmap expeditiously as soon as the necessary amendments are affected.
16. Summit also urged the High Transition Authority (HTA) to allow Malagasy people in exile for political reasons, to be allowed to return to the country unconditionally including Mr Marc Ravalomanana” (Extraordinary summit of the heads of state and government of the Southern African Development Community, 11 and 12 June, 2011, 2-3).

These amendments did not refer directly to a unity government but their implications were that if the three mouvances were to accept the amendments and initial the Roadmap the government had to be recomposed. The SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão, said in a letter to Pres. Ravalomanana on 17 June 2011 that the Summit urged the three mouvances “to initial the roadmap as soon as possible in order to join the institutions of the transition, that must
still be restructured, and to participate in an inclusive transitional process” (Salomão 2011, 1, translated from the original French formulation).

Pres. Chissano’s mediation assistant and former Mozambican Foreign Minister, Leonardo Simão, did not share the same sentiment about a new government and felt that the transitional government in existence at the time must also become the new Government of National Unity – thereby excluding the three oppositional mouvances. He also described the incumbent Prime Minister as the “Prime Minister of Consensus” envisaged by the amended Roadmap (M. Ravalomanana, Report on Madagascar to the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the International Contact Group in Addis Ababa, 4 July 2011, 3-4). The Mozambican presence in SADC’s relationship with Madagascar (i.e. the Executive Secretary Salomão, Pres. Chissano and Simão) complicated the matter at that stage. As a result the Ravalomanana group complained about them and stated: “The SADC mediation team, in particular Leonardo Simao, is biased towards the illegal regime. It is making public statements about the process and the decisions taken by SADC that are not in line with the communicated decisions of the SADC Heads of State” (M. Ravalomanana, Report on Madagascar to the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the International Contact Group in Addis Ababa, 4 July 2011, 3).

An example of Salomão’s interference was with regard to the Roadmap amendment of paragraph 20 dealing with Ravalomanana’s return to Madagascar. While paragraph 16 in the Summit Communiqué used the phrase “return to his country unconditionally”, Salomão provided an extended interpretation of the resolution in a letter to Ravalomanana (Salomão 2011, 2) by adding the formulation: “Mr. Marc Ravalomanana can return to Madagascar only after creation of favourable political and security conditions”. Thereby he tried to reintroduce the original conditional formulation of the ‘French’ and ‘TGV’ Roadmaps. The Rajoelina-led government immediately realized the opportunity created by the Salomão formulation and on 23 August 2011 the Council of Government decided to “reiterate our firm commitment to conform with the arrangements of the amended Roadmap as it was presented by the Executive Secretary of SADC in his letter dated 17 June 2011” (Conseil de Gouvernement 2011, 2, translated from the original French formulation).

Given the negative response to Salomão’s formulation, he was forced to withdraw it in a letter to the “Leaders of all Malagasy Political Stakeholders” on 14 September 2011: “Unfortunately I regret to inform that my letter was not an accurate representation of the Summit Decision as quoted above. … With the above clarification, I hereby withdraw the amendment I prepared through the letter of 17 June, 2011” (Letter, Tomaz Augusto Salomão to Leaders of all Malagasy Political Stakeholders, 14 September 2011: 1-2).

After the formulations of the amendments were accepted by all the stakeholders the Rajoelina Platform and the mouvances of Ravalomanana and Zafy signed the amended Roadmap on 17 September 2011. Ratsiraka was the only stakeholder that refused to sign it. Immediately after its acceptance, the focus shifted to implementation of the agreement. Pres. Ravalomanana wrote to Deputy Minister Marius Fransman, Pres. Zuma’s envoy as Chairperson of the SADC Organ (M. Ravalomanana, Personal letter, Marc Ravalomanana to Marius Fransman, 19 September 2011 ) about it:

I ordered our delegation to sign the Roadmap after they explained to me in some detail that our signature would be followed by a meeting at high level with the SADC Organ Troika to discuss the “modalities” for the implementation of the Roadmap. Amongst the issues are the balance of power between the parties, particularly the position of the Prime Minister, and the creation of a new
transitional government in terms of the Roadmap. A critical issue will be my early return to Madagascar and my role in the country upon my return.

The latter matter was complicated by the fact that on 17 September 2011 – the day that the Roadmap was signed – the HAT’s Minister of Justice authorized a warrant for Ravalomanana’s arrest as well as another Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) preventing the Ravalomanana family from boarding any aircraft bound for Madagascar (Rakotoarivelo 2011, 2). It was directly in conflict with the letter and spirit of the new Roadmap.

One of the most serious shortcomings in the Malagasy Roadmap is that it did not include a multi-stakeholder monitoring and verification commission similar to the one provided by the Zimbabwean Global Political Agreement (2008) and by the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005). The SADC Organ tried to perform the tasks on their own and therefore the Ministerial Committee of the Organ Troika went to Madagascar from 13 to 14 October 2011 to formalize the implementation framework.

The expectations of the Mouvance Ravalomanana regarding a new unity government were presented to the Ministerial Committee in the following terms:

- Creating a new, inclusive and consensual transitional government of national unity and attendant institutions of transition to govern Madagascar and to oversee the holding of internationally supervised, free and fair elections within a year;
- Creating a balance of power between the contesting parties in Madagascar which can be defined as the eight (8) “mouvances” supporting the leader of the current illegal regime; and the three major political mouvances of President Ravalomanana and those of former presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy (M. Ravalomanana, Concerns ahead of the implementation of the SADC Roadmap to end the crisis in Madagascar, 11 October 2011, 3).

Rajoelina and his supporters did not articulate in public their views or expectations of a unity government. In view of their stance and actions before and after adoption of the amended Roadmap it was apparent that political power had to remain concentrated with Rajoelina even though the number of participants in government could be extended thereby preventing distribution of power or power-sharing. Inclusion of the oppositional mouvances was therefore more intended as legitimization of Rajoelina rule than as a establishing a new power balance. Such a visualization of the unity government was premised on the assumption that support by the Malagasy military and France for Rajoelina would be guaranteed and that they would be able to convince the SADC mediators of Rajoelina’s merits and that Ravalomanana is guilty of crimes against humanity. Rajoelina also accepted the unity government on the understanding that Ravalomanana will be isolated from it despite the Roadmap’s amended paragraph 20.

The main test of the GNU was in the first instance not its conceptualization in the Roadmap but its practical implementation. The Roadmap was vague on implementation and could be interpreted as allowing Rajoelina and the Malagasy political stakeholders sole responsibility for the implementation. Paragraph 45 as an interpretation of the implementation of amended paragraph 20, certainly claimed that Malagasy sovereignty cannot be challenged by the implementation process, especially regarding amnesty. However, the South Africans in the SADC Organ decided to take the initiative and Deputy Minister Fransman led the Ministerial Committee to Madagascar to formalize the implementation process. During their visit in October 2011 the stakeholders agreed on the Implementation Framework of the Roadmap (Cadre de mise en œuvre – Projet 4, 15 October 2011). It identified three implementation dates: 1 November
2011 for appointment of the Prime Minister of Consensus, 17 November 2011 for appointment of the members of the transitional government and transitional parliament, and 30 November 2011 for the First Act of Parliament to ratify the Roadmap (Organ Troika Mission Antananarivo 2011, 2) (Cadre de mise en œuvre – Projet 4, 15 October 2011, 2-3). An observation is that this first implementation phase was never followed by other formal phases to implement also the other outstanding Roadmap items, such as the amnesty legislation, human rights instruments or Ravalomanana’s return.

The first critical appointment in the GNU was the Prime Minister of Consensus. According to the Implementation Framework all the Roadmap signatories could submit a nomination but the candidates must not be from the same political affiliation or province as Rajoelina (Cadre de mise en œuvre – Projet 4, 15 October 2011, 2). In the end the three main candidates were nominated by the Mouvance Ravalomanana, a senior military officer by the Rajoelina Platform and Omer Beriziky by the Mouvance Zafy, although he was an official of the Leader Fanilo party which was part of the Union of Democrats and Republicans for Change (UDC-C) (Xinhua 2011 ). Pres. Ravalomanana is still today categorical in his view that his mouvance’s acceptance of the amended Roadmap was partly motivated by the understanding that the Prime Minister will come from his mouvance. However, Rajoelina’s choice was Beriziky while he also decided to appoint two Vice Prime Ministers, one from the Mouvance Ravalomanana and one from his own group.

**Stasis in Government and Focus on Elections**

Appointment of the government ministers experienced similar problems: they were effectively identified by the President and not by the Prime Minister, the majority of the most senior portfolios went to the Rajoelina supporters, and the Mouvances Ravalomanana and Zafy received only five ministers each out of a total of 35, which made the allocations disproportional. Pres. Ravalomanana (personal interview, 1 February 2013, Hartebeespoort Dam) concluded that these actions violated the ideal of power-sharing. At the end of November 2011 the Mouvances Ravalomanana and Zafy therefore decided to declare a dispute in terms of clause 32 and 43 of the Roadmap and referred it to SADC for resolution. Their main complaints were the following (Ravalomanana Mouvance & Zafy Mouvance 2012, 5-6):

- There is no balance in the appointments between the different political stakeholders, because the opposition received only 12 of the 35 ministerial positions in relatively minor portfolios while several of the most controversial and repressive members of the former government were simply reappointed to their positions.
- The final composition was determined by the President (Rajoelina) and not by the Prime Minister (Beriziky).
- The widespread interference and undue influence exerted on the process by the French government.

Despite several reminders by Ravalomanana, SADC never attended to this dispute. The implementation problems were also considered by the AU Peace and Security Council on 8 December 2011. In its resolution it expressed “its intention to lift the measure on the suspension of the participation of Madagascar in the activities of the AU, …. , and to, accordingly invite the Government of National Union to represent Madagascar in the different AU organs and activities, upon submission by SADC of a report confirming satisfactory progress in the implementation process of the Roadmap, in particular its article 20, as well as the establishment of INEC [electoral commission] and the determination of the electoral calendar” (Peace and
SADC has not yet made such a submission to the PSC and the unity government has not yet been invited by the AU to resume its membership rights.

In order to gain some initiative, Pres. Ravalomanana and his wife made a third attempt on 21 January 2012 to return from South Africa to Madagascar. Both Pres. Zuma and Deputy Min. Fransman were notified about it in advance. While already in Malagasy airspace, they were refused permission to land and had to return to South Africa. It was reported that a party official said afterwards: “Starting from now, the ministers will no longer participate in the Council of Ministers, and the parliamentarians will not participate in the next session” while “nothing but the return of president Ravalomanana will satisfy his supporters” (Berger 2012). Formal suspension of participation followed three months later.

On 2 May 2012 Mamy Rakotoarivelo, the delegation leader of the Mouvance Ravalomanana and president of the Congress of the Transition (i.e. the lower house), notified Pres. Ravalomanana that their Mouvance Ravalomanana suspended its activities in the transitional institutions, specifically their ministers in the councils of government and the councils of ministers, in the plenaries and commissions of parliament and in the national electoral commission (CENI). The main motivation for the decision was the “lack of goodwill and the bad faith practiced by the participants of M. Rajoelina by not implementing the arrangements of the Roadmap in relation to political and social improvements, and specifically articles 16, 17 and 20 of the Roadmap” (Rakotoarivelo 2011, translated from the original French formulation).

Deputy Minister Fransman, the South African envoy, responded to Pres. Ravalomanana by claiming success in the Roadmap’s implementation, by threatening him with a situation that might become uncontrollable, by regretting the suspension decision and then by requesting Ravalomanana to suggest a way out of the abyss (Fransman 2012, 3):

> In this regard we require you to carefully consider and provide us with your good counsel in seeking a solution to the current impasse between yourself and the interim President of the High Transition. We call upon you not to rehash past options but instead to be innovative and provide practical, realistic and implementable solutions based upon the principles of compromise and consensus. Moreover, we seek your guidance as to how we can create, implement and unpack what would constitute a conducive environment for free and fair elections.

Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also expressed her concern on 22 May 2012 about “the difficult cohabitation between the President of the Transition [Rajoelina] and the Prime Minister [Beriziky], the persistent dysfunctions between and within the transitional institutions, the suspension of its participation by the Mouvance Ravalomanana and the absence of continued participation by the Mouvance Zafy” (Ashton 2012, 1, translated from the original French formulation).

The Fransman and Ashton opinions suggested an understanding that the unity government was in crisis, that it depended on the Mouvance Ravalomanana’s presence in government and that the relationship between the President and Prime Minister was dysfunctional. Ravalomanana was therefore not the only reason for the problematic government. These were the last important developments with respect to the GNU. The Mouvance Ravalomanana later lifted its suspension of participation and returned to the transitional institutions but it could not substantially change the governmental relations anymore.

Temporary withdrawal from a unity government regularly happens. The NNP ministers did it in South Africa; the SPLM did it in the Sudan; the MDC-T did it also in Zimbabwe and it happened
also in the Northern Irish unity government. It is normally used as a message of objection to a specific issue or conduct of the other partners. In Madagascar it was about the sense of marginalization and lack of genuine power-sharing, as well as the delays of Pres. Ravalomanana’s return. Once can conclude that they dealt with the very essence of a GNU.

The transition since August 2012 has been dominated by preparations for the elections and also by the Ravalomanana return. The two protagonists met twice in the Seychelles in August 2012 about these issues, followed by the SADC Summit and Tanzania’s assumption of the Chair of the SADC Organ. Between December 2012 and January 2013 the Organ chair convinced both protagonists to publicly withdraw from the presidential elections.

Conclusion
The unity government in Madagascar was not a good example of how one should be used in transitions. Though it did not have the same disastrous consequences as the Arusha agreement (1992) in Rwanda and the Libreville agreement (2013) in the Central African Republic, it magnified the fault-lines in the Malagasy situation, instead of promoting transitional confidence-building and interparty cooperation. It illustrated the point that a multiparty government is not necessarily a unity government. The Malagasy example could not deal with the international legal disqualification of forces involved in unconstitutional changes of government; it could not build a national coalition, because it could not resolve the matter of Pres. Ravalomanana’s exile; it could not create a power-sharing dispensation broadly acceptable to all the participants, because it could not enforce the principle of proportionality and the prescribed President-Prime Minister relationship; and it could not convince the international community (especially the AU and SADC) that the government operates in a legitimate manner – hence Madagascar’s membership of these organisations remains suspended at the time of writing in March 2013.

The Malagasy transition was primarily SADC’s responsibility but it developed into a power struggle with Rajoelina (and in all probability supported by the International Francophonie). Given the stalemate of the Maputo/Addis Ababa phase and the risks of unilateralism in the first Roadmap, SADC had to claim the initiative by ‘imposing’ amendments to the Roadmap (especially regarding Ravalomanana’s return) and later to preclude both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana from the presidential election. None of these interventions were the products of multi-party negotiations and therefore SADC assumed the role of guardian of the unity government concept – a situation that is not really desirable.

The Malagasy example will be remembered not so much for its government design but for its implementation problems. Resistance by Rajoelina against its implementation produced a number of ‘government cycles’ or redesigns. Initial reliance on implementation by the Malagasy political stakeholders themselves failed and therefore SADC responded with its own intervention or ‘political peace enforcement’. Arguably one of the main weaknesses of the Malagasy transition is that it did not include an official multi-stakeholder monitoring and verification commission.

Conceptually, the most challenging aspect of the Malagasy GNU was its accommodation of the AU’s notion of ‘unconstitutional changes of government’ articulated in the Lomé Declaration (2002) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007). The coup in March 2009 was declared as such a category of regime change by the AU and SADC and Rajoelina personifies that occurrence. While several transitions include rebel movements as part of a unity government (for example in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire or CAR), others included only political parties (for example in South Africa, Zimbabwe or Kenya). However, in
none of the cases did the rebel movements dominate the government or did they succeed in changing the government by unconstitutional means – Madagascar was therefore an exception. The Malagasy GNU failed to deal with the illegitimacy of such a situation, reinforced by the fact that Pres. Ravalomanana was entirely excluded from the GNU. It created the paradox that although the amended Roadmap was endorsed by SADC and Rajoelina’s presidency is in accordance with it, neither the AU nor SADC lifted their suspension of Madagascar’s membership.

Madagascar’s transition therefore cannot rely on a legacy cultivated by the unity government but will now have to depend on a credible election.

References


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Abstract
As one of the preferred avenues through which political solutions could be sought, power-sharing arrangements have attracted a broad debate in the literature. Advocates, on the one hand, perceive them as a universal remedy for divided societies, and on the other hand, critics contend that these agreements have a tendency to perpetuate divisions or conflict within societies that are at odds. In the aftermath of the 2008 Zimbabwean political and economic crisis, the country embarked on a power-sharing arrangement to foster political and economic stability under the guidance of SADC. This article, therefore, considers the implementation of the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe highlighting both opportunities and threats that characterize this agreement. It suggests that the design of these agreements is intrinsically faulty and as such tends to affect genuine and credible implementation.

Introduction
Dahl’s (1973) classical assertion that the nature of the regime itself, and its inclusiveness and public contestation, may predispose a nation to a particular syndrome of domestic politics is relevant to the Zimbabwean case. The political contestation in the country has been characterized by both a diversity of viewpoints and unequal distribution of power. Although power struggles are endemic throughout human societies, the situation in Zimbabwe is distinctive in that exclusionary politics is instituted within a military epistemic authority that led to the shaping of political militarism. In this sense, military power has been used to resolve political problems. As a result, there has been the development of an officer corps that is close and aligned to the ruling party and the military has become the most crucial component of the political centre that releases election results. This sordid state of affairs has created “far greater barriers to genuine power-sharing resulting in the politics of continuity” (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010).

Power-sharing arrangements have emerged to be the preferred avenue upon which conflicts can be solved. Whilst they have been applauded for being forward-looking, peace-strengthening and democratic, they have also been criticized for failing to create peace and development in divided societies (Binningsbø 2013). Waking to its economic and political malaise, Zimbabwe
decided to agree to a power-sharing arrangement in order to resolve its problems. This article aims to explore the dynamics of power-sharing in Zimbabwe’s political landscape. The article unfolds by first placing the discussion of power-sharing within a theoretical context to highlight the substantive contributions brought by consociationalism. However, this does not exhaust other conceptual possibilities. The discussion further examines the political context that led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement, arguing that the bifurcated discourses that were reminiscent within Zimbabwean politics led to relational identities. It is these oppositional identities that led to exclusionary and violent politics in the country. Furthermore, an assessment of the ‘agreement’ is proffered and it sets the tone for analysis by problematizing the implementation of the Agreement. The article develops a claim that the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe was fated to fail. This is substantiated with the discovery of key omissions in the agreement. The article concludes by offering policy prescriptions for going forward.

Unpacking Power-Sharing Arrangements
Power-sharing has recently assumed centre stage as a means through which conflicts could be resolved. There has been a noticeable tendency to channel conflict and problematic democratic competition through power-sharing arrangements. Although there is recognition that power-sharing strategies might stabilize the transition to an enduring peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), there are nonetheless questions posed by these arrangements. Evidently, these questions represent both the theoretical and methodological concerns raised by this conversation. Attempts at theorizing about power-sharing have resulted in a plethora of conceptualizations that are temporally and spatially bound. Not only that, power-sharing arrangements have also been used to resolve an array of conflicts ranging from civil wars to political questions. In the same vein, Cheeseman and Tendi (2010) posit that analysis on power-sharing has focused on the end of civil wars without necessary giving attention to challenges of democratic deadlock. To this end, they use veto-player analysis to understand the emergence, disposition and strategic importance of the main veto players who emerged during the power-sharing negotiations. Although this kind of analysis separates partisan and institutional players, they transcend the rather static approach that is often characteristic of this kind of analysis by taking a historical trajectory (ibid). This approach is palatable in sense it is able to tease out historical roots of the key veto players who shape up how the power-sharing was implemented (ibid). This article does not use the veto-player analysis but argues something can be salvaged from this kind of analysis.

The theoretical, methodological and empirical concerns raised by an attempt to understand power-sharing arrangements have necessitated the need for invigorated, innovative conceptual and empirical technologies that will be able to analyze how power-sharing will play out empirically and perhaps, answer the question of “whether or not power-sharing facilitates
reconciliation and reform in the medium to long term” (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). Consequently, the inclination of this article is to follow Arendt Lijphart’s consociationalism power-sharing strategy, although a disclaimer is made to the effect that there are other complex approaches. It must be noted that it would be difficult to do justice to other philosophical underpinnings at this juncture hence the privileging of Lijphart’s analysis. Lijphart’s approach is favored because of its ability to be a “deliberate effort by elites to stabilize the system” (Spears, 2000 citing Lijphart). In his analysis, Lijphart presupposes an arrangement where “all leaders of ethnic groups share power within a governing coalition in which major political decisions about matters of mutual concern are made on the basis of consensus” (quoted in O’Flynn, 2007). In this sense, it can be argued that power-sharing in Zimbabwe fits the consociational arrangement. The beauty of Lijphart’s approach is that it offers institutional packs in the form of stability and this stability is arrived at by ensuring inclusion.

After careful consideration of conceptions of power-sharing, it makes sense to define what power-sharing will mean for this article. Power-sharing arrangements at the most “involve the construction of a more or less inclusive government that represents a broad range of concerned parties, but also may include provisions regarding the distribution of bureaucratic posts and new rules for the make-up of the security forces and their subsequent management” (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, 204). At best power-sharing arrangements can offer advantageous alternative by providing “access to power, allows for broad participation, and as such confers legitimacy on the government and its actions and incentivize political leaders to maintain their proximity to power and ultimately pave way for an effective institutional reform necessary to diffuse the underlying roots of instability” (Mehler 2009). The attainment of these goals might be short-term, although they are compatible with long-term democratization goals (Ottaway 1995). Furthermore, a causal link between power-sharing and democracy has been established (Norris 2008). It is maintained that power-sharing arrangements have the ability to ensure minority representation in decision-making process and create incentives to cooperate especially considered within proportional representation election (ibid). Echoing similar sentiments, Spears (2000) is of the view that power-sharing arrangements are seen as providing alternatives to the high stakes of winner-takes-it-all\(^1\) elections. But, a less than enthusiastic argument, is that power-sharing in itself is undemocratic because it blocks strong opposition, as opposing views are marginalized and excluded (Binningsbø 2013). In fact, they are seen as “condemning opposition parties to accept inferior positions within government, despite their success at the ballot box” (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010).

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\(^1\) Winner-takes-it all, which is endemic in Africa, is seen as a source of electoral problems and as such there has been a call for African leaders to move to a more inclusive electoral system. An inclusive arrangement is seen as being necessary to end cycles of violence and impunity.
The conceptual approaches discussed herein are not really divorced from the empirical world of power-sharing arrangements. But, a conclusion can be drawn that both conceptual and empirical understandings of power-sharing are susceptible to normative analysis. There is nothing wrong with a normative analysis, although this kind of analysis has a tendency to be contingent on one’s opinion. Another point to note is that while the utility of power-sharing in theory cannot be disputed, experience has shown the difficulty of implementing such mechanisms, as will be revealed by this article.

The Political Context that Led to the Global Political Agreement
The situation in Zimbabwe changed as 2008 witnessed political and economic crisis as a consequence of violence instigated against the opposition. This was against the backdrop of Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) losing the majority in parliament to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). For the first round of presidential elections in March, Robert Mugabe garnered 43.2 per cent while Morgan Tsvangirai had 47.9 per cent of the total vote, making the latter a victor, but not to the extent that a run-off election could be avoided – this was held on 27 June 2008 (Smith-Höhn 2009). What transpired after this was a staged operation to hold on to power. Intimidation and violence were used against the opposition and it is argued that violence was committed by soldiers, the police and intelligence operatives (ibid).

The conflict was also played out in oppositional discourses both within the country and in the region. In fact, the Zimbabwean political crisis can best be captured by antagonistic discourses that have been ongoing in the country. Ideologically, Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF used liberation to “prioritise the past over the present in the sense that the national liberation experience is deemed to have marked out the now dominant parties as the legitimate inheritors of the past” (Melber 2003, 129). So the liberation narrative invoked rhetorical rituals that involved refutation of the West, and anyone who was thought to be associated with it was tagged a ‘sell-out’ or agent of imperialism. The ‘puppets’ and ‘sell-outs’ tags have been used ad nauseam to discredit the opposition and its support base (Kamete 2003, 64). Beyond framing MDC as agents of neo-colonialism, there were multiple ‘others’ in the form of independent and international press and countries (Botswana and Zambia) that were opposed to the regime, who were also ‘othered’. To those who were not taken by President Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s selective liberation narrative, the empirical ‘other’ was Mugabe himself. Framing opposition in this way, appealed to a sense of urgency in which the politics of existentialism were played out. By securitizing the MDC and those that opposed him as the ‘other’, President Mugabe’s ZANU-PF was able to justify the use of violence. This was substantiated by the detailed report of the organised violence contained in the Human Rights Watch (corroborated by senior Western diplomats) describing the situation in
Zimbabwe as a “military coup by stealth”. A violent crackdown was stepped up against the opposition and the voters who had the temerity to support it (Amnesty International 2002).

MDC’s alternative discourse deconstructed Mugabe’s diplomatic offensive of placing the Zimbabwean problem at the heart of a larger anti-imperialist and Pan-African stance. The MDC, as a result of their discontent with the ZANU-PF, framed a counter-discourse that placed democracy and human rights at the top of their agenda. Their discontent was a result of violent land seizures which were signs of the breakdown of the rule of law, infringement of the people’s rights, and an attack on democratic principles in Zimbabwe (Chironga and Dewa 2009). Since political mobilizations of identity also point to democratic identity as “relationally constituted against states that are non-democratic” (Hansen 2006, 27), MDC presented Mugabe’s ZANU-PF as undemocratic.

Consequently, the antagonism between the two parties descended further into political violence as Tsvangirai announced withdrawal from the 2008 harmonised elections. This was against an unprecedented level of state-orchestrated violence unleashed against the rural areas believed to be MDC strongholds (Smith-Höhn 2009). Against this situation, elections were held resulting in a resounding 86 per cent victory for Robert Mugabe thanks to the involvement of army state employees responsible for administering elections (ibid). However, these elections were dismissed practically by all observer groups as a sham. The political impasse which ensued after a mock of an election thus necessitated a power-sharing experiment that would culminate into a government of unity.

There is often little in the way of inducements for leaders to demonstrate their collective solidarity, and it has been noted that a risk-acceptant group that has the option of complete political power will be less inclined to go into this agreement (Spears 2000). So, one becomes curious as to why Mugabe would agree to this arrangement against the supposed election ‘victory’ of the 2008 harmonized elections. Mugabe’s decision to agree to the political agreement was framed by what he saw as his electoral possibilities. A constellation of assumptions, especially on the political game board, persuaded him to accommodate such an agreement. At home the economy was in tatters, the international community and his neighbors were pouring pressure on him to back down, and additionally, it was apparent that all his political cards were drawn. Or, as desperation discards logic as well as law, it could be argued that Mugabe was desperate.

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2 The Pan-African Parliament Election Observer Mission noted that “the run-up June elections were characterized by violence, intimidation and political intolerance as well as curtailment of fundamental civil and political rights such as freedom of assembly and freedom of movement” (quoted by Smith-Höhn, 2009). The African Union Observer Mission was of the view that “the run-off elections fell short of the accepted AU standards” (ibid).
Tsvangirai’s motivations to agree to the power-sharing arrangement could be understood from the options that remained to him: “if he walked away, he faced the possibility that Mugabe would cobble together an agreement with Arthur Mutambara” (leader of the MDC’s minority faction); this would “complicate the political situation whilst doing nothing to prevent the continuing collapse of the economy” (Southall 2008). If he made a deal, submits Southall, he could at least try to reverse his luck “by attracting support from moderate elements within ZANU-PF away from Mugabe” (ibid). Whether this political maneuverance worked or not remains a moot point.

Before, the agreement (GPA), there was signing on 21 July 2008 of the Memorandum of understanding (MoU) between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions. The deal was brokered through the then South African President Thabo Mbeki’s facilitation. However, this MoU didn’t spell out the shape the unity government would take but rather outlined the issues to be addressed in order to reach a negotiated settlement (Smith-Höhn 2009). The issue areas for ZANU-PF were sanctions, the land question and external interference, whilst the MDC was concerned about the security of its members, the prevention of violence, calls for stop to hate speech, as well as the role of SADC and African Union as “underwriters and guarantors” of the global political agreement (3).

Thus, on the 15th of September 2008, a marriage of convenience in the form of a power-sharing agreement was brokered between the major political parties in Zimbabwe, namely, the Tsvangirai-led Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), the Mutambara-led Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-M) and the then ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). This Global Political Agreement (GPA) was to pave way for the establishment of a Government of National Unity and the reconstruction of the society at large. In fact, the GPA committed the signatories to resolve all the current economic and political situations and chart a new direction for the country (Article 2). The formation of the new inclusive government was expected to provide an opportunity for considering fundamental reforms in the provision of security and justice services to the people of Zimbabwe.

An Assessment of Global Political Agreement
Although semblances of success, though not resounding, can be witnessed both within the political and economic fronts, there is a cautionary note that the country still has a long way to go. Perhaps first and foremost, the agreement has been able to avert greater political violence and repression that could have ensued. The economy has stabilized since the adoption of the US dollar as the medium of exchange. Though, concern has been raised against the heavy involvement of the military (or at least some individuals) in business. There has been a notable improvement in the availability of food. A new constitution to pave the way for fresh elections with a Bill of Rights promised the right to vote to all adult Zimbabwean though excluding
Examining Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement

diaspora (International Crisis Group 2013). All the Members of Parliament unanimously endorsed the constitution and a new constitution was one of the reforms that were agreed by Mugabe and Tsvangirai under the 2008 power-sharing agreement. Perhaps what is palatable about the new constitution is that there are provisions for freedom of expression and freedom of the media (Section 61 (4)(b-c)). More importantly, the constitutional referendum enabled the European Union to lift the restrictive measures against most of the individuals and entities it had targeted (International Crisis Group 2013). These developments have prompted Steinberg, quoted in the Africa Report 2010, to argue that it would be a mistake to minimize the achievements of the coalition.

Without denying the modest achievements, there were (and there continue to be) noticeable violations of the agreement. For instance, just a month after the signing of the GPA, there was a deadlock over how to allocate key ministries. Tsvangirai accused Mugabe’s ZANU-PF of trying to hold many of the most powerful positions. The MDC saw this political impasse as an attempt by the ZANU-PF to relegate them to the role of a junior partner in a new government. In addition to this snag, President Mugabe has, apparently, been slow in implementing the provisions of the GNU. In Maputo, the SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security for the first time since its inception stood up to President Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. Despite the dissembling propaganda from the state controlled media and hired ZANU-PF spin doctors, the SADC troika found Mugabe culpable in refusing to deal with the issues vital to the survival of the GNU. It ordered Mugabe to respect the timelines for the inception of the inclusive government, as outlined in SADC's 27 January 2009 communiqué, and raised other outstanding issues. The troika highlighted that little progress has been made in fulfilling the some of the critical provisions the GPA such as the inception of the National Economic Council to come up with a programme to restore economic stability and growth; and the slow pace in coming up with a solid programme for the promotion of equality, national healing, cohesion and unity.

Smith-Höhn (2009) highlights contentious issues that were not addressed by the GPA. The land reform, as provided for by Article 5, does not address the need for the land reform policy to be rationalized. A second concern is the issue of sanctions, where the decision to lift sanctions rests with parties external to the agreement (see Smith-Höhn 2009 for a much fuller discussion on this). Thirdly and perhaps “most worrisome is the failure of the agreement to address the need for security sector reforms” (4). This reform deficit confirms Cheeseman and Tendi’s (2010, 207) assertion that power-sharing arrangements “do not create space for reform and can be

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3 Robert Mugabe remained the executive president, while Morgan Tsvangirai as prime minister; ZANU-PF would hold fifteen ministries, the MDC thirteen and Mutambura’s MDC faction three; ZANU-PF would retain the ministry of defence, but the MDC would fill the home-affairs ministry (responsible for the police) as well as finance.
manipulated by incumbents desperate to retain their positions in the face of electoral defeat”. Over the past years, the Zimbabwean security sector has increasingly come into the spotlight as unduly politicized and as infringing on the human rights of the citizens. Yet, the agreement is not explicit on security sector reform except to note “the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors and others in order to resolve political differences and achieve political ends” (Article 18.1). Against the call by both MDC and the SADC facilitator to have security reforms instituted, the high ranking officials of President Mugabe’s government remain resolute that there will be no security sector reforms – Defence Minister Mnangagwa, for example, told senior military personnel that there would be no reforms as long as he remained in government (International Crisis Group 2013). A Zimbabwean think tank argued that the “failure to implement security sector reforms have the potential to block a possible democratic transition as the country prepares for the first election after the formation of the unity government” (Shoko 2013). Lastly, Smith-Höhn (2009) identifies dual executive between Mugabe and Tsvangirai as problematic. The uneasiness with this kind of arrangement has the potentiality for a deadlock since membership overlaps; there might be questions of who has the final say.

**Fated to Fail?**

Even though power-sharing arrangements are implicitly promoted as perfectible and at times considered as precious ends in themselves, the ever ‘patched-up’ peace that is expected more often than not result in less-than desirable outcomes. In this instance, the agreement between the two MDCs and ZANU-PF, the GPA, became an odyssey that did little to resolve the deeply entrenched issues that were at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe. At first glance one cannot help notice that the talks that subsequently led to this agreement were held under immense pressure. And conventional wisdom teaches us that pressure does not necessarily produce positive results.

There were key omissions right from the start that served to weaken the agreement. Firstly, there was no ownership of the agreement by President Mugabe who had referred to the agreement as a “creature”. This was demonstrated by his excitement about the end of the agreement where he stated that “…this two or three-headed creature called the GPA is coming to an end, the clock is ticking” (Anonymous 2013). Referring to the agreement as “this creature” validates the assumption that Mugabe saw this cooperation as merely a ‘wiggle room’ allowing him space for minor compromise so as to appear to have engaged, thus diffusing the opposition claims.

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4 Recall the statements that were made by the Army General Chiwenga that they would not support an opposition government in the event that Mugabe lost the elections.

5 Mugabe as the President chairs the Cabinet with 31 ministers while Tsvangirai chairs a Council of Minister.
Secondly, there were no substantial changes in policy direction or related reforms that were instituted. Of particular interest is the failure to address security sector reforms, despite the fact that it was the securitization of Zimbabwean politics that was responsible for much of the trouble. Furthermore, it has often been argued that power-sharing in peace agreements include at least one of four dimensions – security, territory, politics and economics – with many processes involving more than one (Sriram and Zahar, quoting Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). The danger in not addressing security is that groups are not assured that a resort to violence and repression is unlikely. The mode of power-sharing in Zimbabwe did not create favorable conditions for effective reforms leading to the conclusion that unity government serves to postpone conflict rather than solve it (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). Related to this, elections reforms that are still lagging behind. Chief among these are reforms that include those “intended to address political violence, intimidation and repression; security and law and order deficits; broadcast media restrictions and hostilities and tension among and between political parties” (International Crisis Group 2013, 3). In addition to election related problems is the highly questionable composition of the Zimbabwean electoral commission (ZEC) which boasts among its members former security sector and intelligence operatives allegedly loyal to ZANU-PF (ibid).

Thirdly, there have been contradictions in the expectations from the signatories: MDC expected a resolution to outstanding election roadmap issues even after the adoption of a new constitution whereas ZANU-PF was of the view that the new constitution should supersede the roadmap (International Crisis Group 2013). This election roadmap deadlock was seen as demonstrating that Zimbabwe was not yet ready for elections – sentiments that were echoed by a number of spectators in the same ICG report. The risk anticipated was that having elections under such a climate (without instituting key reforms) would result in a mockery of the process. The ICG (2013, 32) warned that “under current conditions election disputes are unlikely to be resolved conclusively, but could rather lead to negotiations for further power-sharing or provoke a ‘power vacuum’”. However, the likelihood of a conclusive election was seen as marginal because a conclusive election is the sum of a credible process and acceptance of results by key stakeholders. However, President Mugabe in 2012, against exasperated calls, went ahead and announced that elections were going to be held in March 2013. This was an unrealistic timeline, as most reforms, especially elections related ones, had not been instituted. Electoral reforms that were identified as key included, *inter alia*, “the need to speedily implement the election roadmap; clean voter’s rolls and timely deployment of observers with the mandate to monitor elections” (International Crisis Group 2013).

**Conclusion**

Africa has seen most power-sharing arrangements fail or being inapplicable except for the unique few. For that reason, it is not surprising to be less-than thrilled by another power-sharing
experiment. The problem is that the analysis of “the conditions necessary for power-sharing to be effective, and the likely consequences if these conditions do not hold, has been largely superficial” (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). Additionally, there has been a problem with the literature of power-sharing which have been preoccupied with power-sharing to end civil wars. Less attention has been paid to power-sharing arrangements that promise to solve political gridlock problems. Needless to say, empirical evidence has shown that the pathway to power-sharing arrangements, and more importantly its impact, has fallen short of the desired outcome. The Global Partnership Agreement, for instance, was broad and sweeping in terms of the promised reforms. It was a measure apparently inspired by the low motive for cooperating: for the sake of saving face (in Mugabe’s case) and in so far as it was so, it would become inoperative and useless when the cooperation should cease. It may be fairly questioned whether the agreement has diminished rather than increased the sum of MDC’s power. If it diminishes, it will be a loss for democracy.

Significantly, power-sharing arrangements, if they are well thought, “can only work where there is a genuine desire for commitment among the respective leaders towards peace, and sufficient imagination and innovation to create appropriate structures and institutions” (Spears 2000, 117). To this end, then, it becomes crucial for the guarantors of this agreement, SADC and the African Union, to increase their monitoring capacity, set-up an in-country liaison office, define their ‘red lines’, and demand compliance to their democratic principles and guidelines (International Crisis Group 2013).

References
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Revisiting South Africa’s Contemporary Political Risk Profile

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Abstract
The impetus for this paper is a downgrading of South Africa by ratings agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor of South Africa’s sovereign debt rating shortly after the so-called Marikana incident during the last months of 2012. The Marikana incident was followed by turbulence in the farming industry and related social tension and policy uncertainty in 2012. The question arises whether political, economic and social conditions in South Africa are currently posing greater political risk for potential investment than during the 1990s to mid-2000s. This calls for a fresh assessment of relevant indicators or variables in the South African context as well as a reasoned, empirically defensible and testable attempt that is not merely mirroring the idiosyncratic opinion of the analyst. In other words, what is needed is an analysis of relevant political risk indicators that are based on a sound intellectual tradition and practical logic. Against this background this study is an attempt to revisit and analyse current political risk in South Africa on the basis of a selected set of indicators or variables that are commonly and internationally used in risk analysis frameworks.

Introduction
In an authoritative and significant study conducted in 2005 on political risks for South Africa, Prof Albert Venter (now emeritus professor) argued that South Africa’s macro-political risk image in the mid-2000s (circa 2005) could best be portrayed as a ‘medium risk category’ (Venter 2005, 52). Venter based his study on the identification of macro political risks in South Africa, specifically premised on risk indicators or variables used in research by Howell and Chadwick, which are widely recognised by international institutions, government agencies and major corporations as fundamental in operational and strategic planning (Venter 2005, 29-30; Fouché 2003, 11).

Since Venter conducted his research, South Africa has experienced an important change at the top-level of political leadership and much has changed in the political arena in general. Moreover, towards the end of 2012, South Africa experienced several serious so-called wildcat strikes in the
mining industry, social tension and regulatory uncertainty. This followed the tragedy at Lonmin’s Marikana Mine on the 16th of August in the Rustenburg area of the North West Province that focused international attention on the South African political landscape after a series of violent incidents between the South African Police Service, Lonmin security, the leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) being the largest trade union in the mining industry, and the striking Lonmin workforce. The Marikana incident resulted in the deaths a figure of more than 40 people, the majority of whom were striking mineworkers killed by the South African police service. Close to 80 additional workers were also injured on the 16th of August. The number of injured people during the strike remains unknown. This was followed by instability in the agricultural sector around the De Doorns town in the Western Cape Province where illegal protests resulted in severe labour unrest in the wine industry.

The main impetus behind the writing of this article is the downgrading of South Africa’s sovereign debt rating in the aftermath of the Marikana incident during the last months of 2012 by ratings agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor. The downgrading means that the South African government will have to pay more for borrowing money, making it more challenging to finance infrastructure projects and the economy in general. The effect was specifically evident because of the wide range of Moody downgraded credit ratings: 12 municipalities, the Development Bank of South Africa and deposit ratings of Standard Bank, Absa, FirstRand, Nedbank and Investec. In fact, these institutions were all placed on “negative watch”, meaning further downgrades could follow unless conditions improve (Shevel, Marais and Lefifi 2012).

In view of these developments, Kevin Lings, chief economist at Stanlib, indicated that unlike country downgrades for instance in the European Union, South Africa’s downgrade “is not because of a tough economy. It has to do with our domestic issues and the way we have not managed to articulate our economic policy... that has led to a high degree of uncertainty around policy” (as quoted by Shevel, Marais and Lefifi 2012).

The question arises whether political, economic and social conditions in South Africa are currently posing a greater political risk for potential investment than during the 1990s to the mid-2000s. This calls for a fresh assessment of relevant indicators or variables in the South African context as well as a reasoned, empirically defensible and verifiable investigation that does not merely mirror the idiosyncratic opinion of the analyst. In other words, what is needed is an analysis of relevant political risk indicators that are based on a sound intellectual tradition and practical logic (Venter 2005, 28-29). Against this background, this study is an attempt to analyse current political risk in South Africa based on a set of indicators or variables that are commonly used internationally in risk-analysis frameworks.

**Background: Notes on Risk Analysis and the South African State in 2013**
Fouché (2003, 1) explains that numerous risk factors impact on the general conditions and investment environment of a country where foreign involvement is contemplated, irrespective of the nature and scope of involvement. McKellar (2010, 6) states that political risk is relevant because it is important for businesses to understand and is inescapable when dealing with markets.

Political risk directly relates to the functioning of two very different, but interacting domains, namely business and politics. Business exists to create profits for itself and its stakeholders, and business leaders or managers share a mindset around the ideas of market share, growth margins and return on investment. Business is affected by the laws of the state, and business furthermore takes place in a framework ultimately set by political authority and social relations. In developed states, business can afford to take this framework for granted, but in developing states, business needs to adapt to changing and often volatile political landscapes (McKellar 2010, 6-7).

In view of the above, political risk can be defined as a potential harm to a business operation arising from political behaviour. Political actors and their behaviour are concerned with the social organisation and underlying ideals of society. The basis of political actors and their behaviour relate to issues pertaining to authority, ideology, political culture, social identity, the social good and the levers of power to influence these (McKellar 2010, 6). South Africa is a developing country, and given the country’s political dynamics over many years, political risk has always been an issue and will remain important in the evolution of the future political landscape in South Africa. This point has been highlighted in the post-Marikana context when several authoritative analysts and commentators remarked and commented on the future of South Africa. For instance, Clem Sunter (2012), former Chairman of the Anglo American Chairman’s Fund and probably South Africa’s most prominent scenario planning practitioner, stated that

Just over a year ago, Chantelle Illbury¹ and I were giving a 70% probability to South Africa staying in the Premier League, 30% to a peaceful decline into the Second Division and zero to a Failed State. With the tabling of the Secrecy Bill, we changed to 50% for Premier League, 40% for Second Division and 10% for Failed State... With the Marikana tragedy ushering in a period of industrial turmoil, which aggravated by the lack of service delivery, can escalate into a full-blown South African version of the Arab Spring, we have revised the probability yet again. While we are keeping Premier League at 50%, we now have amended the changes of a peaceful versus violent, anarchic decline from 40:10 to 50:50 and therefore accord the Second Division and Failed State scenarios each a 25% probability... Like everyone else, neither Chantelle nor I wish to raise the probability of a terrible outcome. But the flags say otherwise...

¹ Sunter’s colleague.
Given the need for a fresh and thorough assessment of political risk in South Africa, this article is methodologically, largely based on work done by Venter (2005), who employed fifteen risk indicators to determine the current political risk for South Africa. These are: threatening neighbouring states and foreign policy environment; authoritarian measures to retain power; staleness of incumbency and leadership succession; legitimacy of government; military involvement in politics; social risk (including terrorism and religious fundamentalism); socio-economic conditions; racial, ethnic and religious cleavages; Black economic empowerment; trade union activism; safety and security; labour policy; macro-political-economic circumstances; administrative (in)competence in government; and the security of private property.

In an attempt to determine or measure continuity and change in the political risk profile of South Africa, a combination of the variables or indicators in the academic work of Fouché (2003) and Venter (2005) are being used in this article as a framework of analysis for assessing South Africa’s current political risk profile. The article does not claim to present a complete political risk analysis, but to provide the readership with a basic overview of some of the most significant indicators or variables needed to determine or outline South Africa’s current political risk profile.

**Threatening Neighbouring States**

Threatening neighbouring states as a variable or indicator relates to what is also described as ‘bad neighbours’, which concerns the regional situation in which a country finds itself. Nearby superpowers usually come into play as a factor because they are inclined to control their immediate surroundings, sometimes forcibly. This variable may also include regional trouble spots, especially those having a history of continued violence, such as the Middle East (Fouché 2003, 28-29).

In the mid-1990s, South Africa experienced a reasonably secure external environment. There were no immediate enemies or competitors for regional hegemony and the country was not threatened by a powerful state. On the international scene South Africa has started to play a significant role with former President Thabo Mbeki as a respected state visitor to many countries (Venter 2005, 31-32).

In recent times, South Africa has remained officially committed to continue to focus its foreign policy on promoting the integration of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the unity and the renewal of the African continent, South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue. South Africa is also firmly committed to working with other countries for a global system of governance that is democratic and responsive to the interests and aspirations of developing countries through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy (Nkoana-Mashabane 2011, 3-4).
It can further be stated that South Africa faces no immediate threat by so-called bad neighbours and its regional context is a far cry from the threatening regional environments that are facing countries such as Israel or South Korea. At the same time, it should be noted that Africa is the region most affected by international terrorism, specifically as terror continues to feed on sources pertaining to huge imbalances and disparities in socio-economic conditions, corruption and ineffective governance (Cilliers 2012, 2). At the same time, many of these challenges manifest in countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, and Kenya. Southern African states are generally (except for Tanzania) not associated with terrorist activities. Furthermore, none of South Africa’s neighbours seem to face any significant political threat in the form of potential armed insurrection or terrorism. At most, they face challenges posed by “African voters [who] demand more than historical mobilisation as justification for their vote, particularly in urban areas where social media is experiencing massive growth” (Cilliers 2012, 2). However, the so-called Zimbabwe factor in South Africa’s regional environment (Venter 2005, 31) remains a factor, if only in the form of a potential influx of illegal immigrants. But generally, few if any investors or observers will argue that South Africa is located in a bad neighbourhood marked by high political risk.

Authoritarian Measures to Retain Power
Authoritarianism pertains to a lack of democracy, ranging from totalitarianism to authoritarianism that may lead to discontent. Violence usually lies very close to the surface. This indicator includes rigid control over citizens, even though sometimes superficial control (Fouché 2003, 28-29).

Venter (2005, 33) described the South African political landscape of the mid-2000s as a democratic state where the government did not need any authoritarian measures to retain power. However, the country’s body politic was marked by an absence of a strong formal opposition that could act as a serious political contender at the polls. The problem is that a state under long-term one-party dominance, despite its nominal constitutional democratic status, is still prone to sink into arrogance and corruption, and to confuse the interests of the state with that of the party.

In recent years the Democratic Alliance (DA), the main parliamentary opposition in South Africa, has managed to make some inroads by winning 16.7 per cent of the national vote and 67 seats in the National Assembly, which are up from 12.3 per cent of the vote and 50 seats in the National Assembly in 2004. The DA also won the Western Cape Province with an outright majority of 51.1 per cent of the provincial vote (Democratic Alliance 2012).

Despite the DA’s gains at the polls, The Economist (2012) maintains that nearly two decades after apartheid ended, South Africa is becoming a de facto two-party state. Jolobe (2012, 6) likewise contends that the ANC has consolidated its position “as a ruling dominant party” in the “absence of real interparty political competition”, although intraparty competition has become
highly significant with small alliances of people uniting to further their own private interests within the organisation. What is especially disturbing, is Makhanya’s contention pertaining to a blurring of the line between party and state in South Africa, and that public servants are recruited on the basis of political connections rather than skills and expertise (Makhanya 2011, 4).

In view of the above, authoritarian measures to retain power as an indicator does not seem to be spelling high political risk per se, but indications are that the ruling ANC is not following an approach of clearly distinguishing between administrative and political systems (Makhanya 2011, 4). This certainly does not instil confidence in South Africa’s state institutions – a point that is clearly endorsed by The Economist (2012). In fact, the phenomenon of so-called cadre deployment – where the ANC’s deployment strategy systematically places loyalty above merit and even of competence – has been cited as a serious obstacle to efficient public service by various commentators and role-players, among which the Human Sciences Research Council (Areff 2012).

**Staleness of Incumbency and Calibre of Leadership**

Fouché (2003, 28-29) explains that staleness, as based on the Economic Intelligence Unit of The Economist, occurs when a leader has been in power for a period of longer than ten years. Such leaders tend to become detached, stale, and complacent, which in turn may encourage corruption, disdain and delay in political processes. Staleness of incumbency also relates to the hegemonic position of a party – which certainly applies to the ruling ANC in South Africa, which has been in power since 1994. Few political analysts, if any, would disagree with the point that the ANC today, is facing a severe challenge of staleness of incumbency – a point that was strongly argued by Venter (2005, 34) in the mid-1990s.

Venter (2005, 34) described South Africa’s political leadership during the mid-2000s as being of a “reasonably high calibre” and that (former) Pres. Thabo Mbeki set a fine example of leadership. At the same time, Venter highlighted the issue of Mbeki’s successor as a “general risk”. His remark concerning an “unsavoury wrangle about the position of Jacob Zuma, deputy president of the ANC and dismissed deputy president of the country” was particularly instructive and significant (Venter 2005, 34). However, it is common knowledge that Zuma managed to survive the controversial Shabir Shaik trial regarding corruption in an arms deal in 1999-2000, and that he became the president of South Africa after he masterminded the removal of Mbeki as president of the ANC and South Africa’s head of state (see Chikane 2012).

As South Africa’s head of state since 2009, Zuma has been severely criticised in the media by analysts and commentators, and by middle-class South Africans for his poor leadership. The Economist (2012) describes him as someone who
had had a string of close shaves with the law for both grand corruption and squalid sexual behaviour; in his favour were his charm, homespun intelligence and canny ability to mediate between people and the many factions that make up the ANC. But stuck between the impatient masses stirred up by racial populists such as Julius Malema [the former leader of the ANC Youth League] on the one hand, and anxious capitalists and greedy party bigwigs on the other, he has drifted and dithered, offering neither vision nor firm government.

Like many other public commentators, Prof. Hussein Solomon, senior professor of Political Science at the University of the Free State, publicly lambasted Zuma for his poor political leadership and lack of government strategy to deal with the relevant issues while South Africa experienced a wave of strikes in the mining and transport industries. In the cynical words of Solomon: “South Africans, you are on your own. Do not look for leadership from this rudderless, morally bankrupt and intellectually in" (Solomon 2012). Former Johannesburg Stock Exchange CEO and respected businessman, Russel Loubser, likewise blamed South Africa’s top leadership for failing to recognise the serious problems facing the country, listing the Marikana killings as a crisis that could have been avoided.

Even former president Thabo Mbeki took the extraordinary step to lash out against Zuma’s leadership of the country. Mbeki did not mention Zuma by name, but it was clear that he was referring to Zuma when he expressed “great unease” with the “dangerous and unacceptable situation of directionless and unguided national drift” (Ngalwa, Shoba and Kgosana 2012). Clearly there is much concern about Zuma’s leadership among many middle-class and well-informed South Africans and in this regard few outside the ANC would argue that South Africa’s top leadership is still of a ‘reasonably high calibre’ or that South Africans have little to be concerned about as far as the quality of top leadership is concerned.

Zuma’s position as ANC leader was strengthened at the ANC’s Mangaung (Bloemfontein) Conference in December 2012. For many observers the election of ANC veteran and business magnate, Cyril Ramaphosa, to the second-most senior position of deputy president of the governing ANC, brought new hope that his accession to the top level of political leadership will inject new energy into Zuma’s “tame” and “unimaginative” leadership and steer the country in a new trajectory (Jongbloed 2012, 8).

Legitimacy of Government
Fouché (2003, 29) explains that legitimacy refers to the unforced and positive acceptance of rule by the citizenry. The gap between a government’s acceptability and its insistence to remain in power indicates its lack of legitimacy and increases the level of risk in a country. There can be little doubt that the ANC enjoyed legitimacy as a government since 1994, but it progressively had to face legitimacy challenges at municipal level since the mid-2000s; incidents that clearly
demonstrated dissatisfaction with local authorities or municipalities on a broad basis (Venter 2005, 37).

It is clear that dissatisfaction with municipalities have increased considerably over the past decade. In fact, it seems that confidence remains far lower in this sphere of government than at the national and provincial levels. Research undertaken by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation is instructive. In 2010, more than half of all South Africans, i.e. 55 per cent, indicated that they have little or no confidence in local government (Lefko-Everett, Nyoka and Tiscornia 2011, 19). Higher than expected voter turnout at the 2011 local government elections was an important signifier of greater democratic participation, but this is balanced by research results indicating that since 2005 an estimated average of more than 8 000 “Gatherings Act” incidents were recorded per year. In this context, it should be noted that collective dissatisfaction in South Africa is often shown through public demonstrations and that these protests “have reached extremely high levels since 2005” (Lefko-Everett, Nyoka and Tiscornia 2011, 13-16).

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation finds that low levels of both public confidence in local government and trust in elected leadership and public officials are reason for concern, and that increasingly violent and destructive ‘service delivery’ protests may foreshadow events yet to come. This is undoubtedly an area that requires dedicated efforts towards improvement (Lefko-Everett, Nyoka and Tiscornia 2011: 47) as it has the potential to spiral out of control and results in further destruction of public infrastructure and private property. This is one area that points to considerably greater political risk than what existed during the 1990s and early 2000s.

Military Involvement in Politics
Internationally, political interference by the military is sometimes spurred on by the absence of a legitimate civilian government, resulting in the military taking control of government (Fouché 2003, 29). At the same time, it should be stated that the past two or three decades have seen a shrinkage in the political role of the military and security establishments in many parts of the world. Elections have replaced military coups and full-blown military regimes have become something of a dying breed, but the longstanding legacies of military rule continue to cast a shadow over many newly created democracies (Luckman 2003, 7-8). In the African context, this remains an important political factor as is evident in Egypt at the time of writing.

During the apartheid era, the policy-making process in South Africa was significantly militarised. Acutely aware of the relative lack of civil supervision of the security organisations during the apartheid era, the constitutional planners and the ANC-led government went to considerable lengths to ensure that control and supervision of the military was vested in democratic structures (Cawthra 2003, 33-38). Earlier, Venter (2005, 36) argued that military involvement in politics was an insignificant political risk and recently Cilliers (2012, 2) remarked that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is an important if
unappreciated foreign policy instrument of the South African government and serves the national interest of the country in many ways. Thus, the potential of political interference by the SANDF does not pose a political risk of any substance. What might be more of a concern in the broader political context relates to the issue of the SANDF’s operational budget that has been stripped to the bone, resulting in capability gaps and poor maintenance of sophisticated equipment in the SANDF (Jordan 2012, 2). Of even greater concern than the operational state of the military and its (potential) involvement in politics are assertions that the intelligence services remain central to the power structure of the South African state. In this regard, Pres. Zuma apparently constantly drew on his intelligence connections – intelligence officials and military figures – to support or sustain his presidential power base (see for instance Holden and Van Vuuren 2011).

Social Risk: Extremism, Religious Tension and Terrorism

This indicator or variable could relate to the domination of society or government by a single religious group that seeks to exclude other religions from political or social structures and processes; to suppress religious freedom; to replace civil law by religious law; or to dominate the governing process. Religious radicals can have a major impact on a country and the political risk associated with a country (Fouché 2003, 36). After all, events in relation to the 9/11 tragedy have highlighted the threat of international terrorism associated with religious militancy and its impact on a singular state.

Venter (2005, 37) remarked that despite the warnings of the former Minister of the Intelligence Services, Ronnie Kasrils, that al-Qaida might have sleeper cells in South Africa, it is unlikely that South Africa was seen as a high priority for al-Qaida and related Islamist movements. He also stated that since 1994 the potential of revolution or revolts against the government has decreased, although the potential for societal instability in relation to right-wing militancy or bombings by groups such as the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) remained as a “dormant risk”.

In recent years, barring the arrest of a handful of right-wingers in 2012 whose political intent was to target ANC leaders, no serious incidents in the form of militant action against the state from either right-wing or religious extremists have been recorded in recent years, bringing the potential for such societal instability to a comparatively low level. Furthermore, in recent years religious intolerance has not been cited by researchers or analysts as a significant threat to societal stability. However, as it has been pointed out, social risk in the form of service delivery protests have increased markedly and this particular phenomenon remains a factor of the highest concern in any consideration of forces and events that could negatively influence investors’ confidence.
Lastly, a type of xenophobia against illegal immigrants has developed in the past decade (Venter 2005, 31), something that has been prevalent in the form of attacks on foreign nationals since late 2007 to 2008. Xenophobic attacks have reappeared in 2013 but this has not posed a significant threat to security on a national scale.

**Socio-Economic Conditions**

Socio-economic conditions as an indicator attempts to measure the satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the socio-economic policies of the government in a country. Relevant socio-economic factors vary from country to country and include, among others, aspects ranging from infant mortality, the provision of medical care to the level of interest rates. It could also relate to disparities between different strata of society or an unequal distribution of wealth and their impact on social challenges such as crime, unemployment, illiteracy, drug use and health conditions (Fouché 2003, 32-35).

In his earlier analysis, Venter (2005, 37-38) highlighted two issues of major concern in South Africa, namely extreme differences in wealth and the Aids pandemic. As far as the wealth differential was concerned, South Africa’s has always been one of the steepest in the world. Obviously, in a democracy this has an effect on the political risk for investors since the governing minority will be inclined to overtax the wealthy. The only positive aspect has been a growth in the middle class, which, according to Venter (2005, 38), “augurs well for longer term political stability and economic growth”.

Much has been written about the Aids pandemic in South Africa during the Mbeki-era. Suffice it to say that the prevalence rate in the age cohort of 15-49 was estimated at 21.5 per cent (Venter 2005, 39). This was the single, predominating topic of Mbeki’s reign in high office, since he believed that “HIV was a harmless passenger virus and that Aids symptoms were caused by malnutrition and antiretroviral therapy” (Asmal 2011, 214).

Few informed South African observers would still list the Aids pandemic among the most acute challenges for the current South African government. In fact, the government has been issuing anti-retrovirals to patients on a national basis. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of issues relating to unemployment, poverty and inequality. The “triple challenge”, as it has been dubbed by President Zuma, is currently South Africa’s most vexing social and human-development predicament (Mail & Guardian 2012a). Measured in terms the Gini coefficient, South Africa – at 63.1 or an equivalent 0.63 – is much higher than developing countries such as Brazil at 54.7 and India at 334 (Mail & Guardian, 2012c).

According to Mark Cutifani, chief executive officer of AngloGold Ashanti, unemployment is “the most dispiriting in the short term, and potentially debilitating in the long term” (Cutifani
In terms of the official definition\(^2\), the unemployment rate was 23.9 per cent (Statistics South Africa 2012a, 56). What is of particular concern is that South Africa’s unemployment is most acute in the 15-34 age cohorts. Thus underlying the general unemployment crisis is primarily a youth unemployment crisis. Small wonder that youth unemployment in South Africa is often described as a ticking time bomb (Statistics South Africa 2012a, 61; Cutifani 2012, 5).

The problem of youth unemployment is further underlined by figures of dispiritingly low levels of educational achievement in the 20 years and older cohort. Out of this group, 8.6 per cent recorded “no schooling” as their level of education; 12.2 per cent recorded “some primary”; 4.6 per cent recorded “completed primary” and a staggering 33.8 per cent recorded “some secondary”. This means that one-third of South Africans older than 20 years have not completed their secondary education. Furthermore, 28.4 per cent South Africans above 20 years have completed Grade 12 (Standard 10), while only 12.1 per cent have any form of post-school qualification (Statistics South Africa 2012a, 48-49). Although the figures have improved gradually over the past decade (Statistics South Africa 2012b, 2), these figures still spell high political risk and could result in future social instability.

Moreover, the gap between middle-class black-and-white schools at the upper ends of academic performers and the masses of children in poor schools seems to be widening (Jansen 2012a, 1). It is obvious that problems in South Africa’s schooling system cut deep and wide into matters relating to skilled labour in South Africa. Many communities have become disenchanted with their political, economic and social conditions.

### Safety and Security

This indicator or variable is also sometimes described as “law and order”. Law entails an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, whereas order relates to an assessment of the popular observance of the law of a country (Fouché 2003, 36). Venter uses this indicator to reflect on crime rates in South Africa as well as the measure of corruption in society. He cited safety and security in South Africa during the mid-2000s as one of the biggest concerns for foreign and local investors in South Africa. He also pointed out that South Africa measured badly on the Transparency International Corruption Index, having been listed 48 out of 140. He concluded that crime, safety and security, as well as corruption posed a significant political risk to investors in South Africa (Venter 2005, 43).

Many South Africans would probably argue that little has changed in South Africa since the mid-2000s. Yet, statistically it seems that South Africa’s overall crime situation has improved steadily over the past decade. Since the 2002/03 financial year, when total crime levels peaked in South Africa, the overall crime rate has decreased by 21 per cent. However, this trend changed

\(^2\) Persons who did not work, but were available to work in the reference period.
when a 3 per cent increase in total crime levels was recorded in the two-year period between 2007/08 and 2009/10. Total crime rates decreased again by 2.4 per cent between 2009/10 and 2010/11, whereas the latest figures indicate a decrease of 0.6 per cent\(^3\) (Institute for Security Studies 2012, 1).

What should be noted, however, is that data gathered by Municipal IQ, an independent local-government-monitoring agency, indicated that a 289 per cent increase in the number of violent protests against municipalities was recorded between 2008 and 2009. There was a slight drop in the number of protests in 2011, but an increase again in 2012 (Newham 2012). What is also of interest is that though crime statistics indicate a decrease in most crimes, a survey conducted by Statistics South Africa reveals “a nation gripped by fear”. In short, public perceptions show a high level of fear and distrust in the police and law enforcement in general (Masombuka and Hosken 2012, 5).

Lastly, as far as corruption goes, South Africa has slipped further down in recent times on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. From 2010, the country’s ranking has steadily declined from 54\(^{\text{th}}\) to 69\(^{\text{th}}\) of the countries surveyed in 2012 (Lewis 2012, 14). Although the regulatory environment in South Africa has continuously been improved, corruption is rife in the granting of government contracts. Bribery thrives in government circles and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Strategy has been criticised for too much preferential treatment to wealthy black elites in relation to receiving government contracts (Business Anti-corruption Portal 2012) – a point also raised by Venter (2005, 40) several years ago.

**Racial, Ethnic and Language Cleavages**

Fouché (2003, 36-37) explains that countries with high levels of ethnic tension are generally awarded poor ratings as such societies generally represent “a negative political environment”. Likewise, the dominance of a particular society by a single religious group tends to lead to the exclusion of other religions from political or social structures.

Venter (2005, 39-40) maintained that South Africa in the mid-2000s experienced colour/racial and ethnic divisions in society that were substantial and exclusionist. These differences were deep and a potential source of tension. Also, support from the voting population for political parties was mostly racially based.

Recently, Lefko-Everett et al (2011, 19) contended that South Africa remains a deeply divided society – something that has been a discouragingly consistent finding of the SA Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) survey, conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) since

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\(^3\) It is important to remember that these figures only tell us about crimes that were recorded by the South African Police Service (SAPS).
2003. However, they also pointed towards “important and positive signals” of progress in reconciliation, social cohesion and nation-building in recent years. Lefko-Everett (2012, 12) even asserts that as time goes by, South Africans become increasingly less likely to identify race as the most significant or biggest division in the country. Instead, the gap between rich and poor is named most frequently as the “fault line” that runs through South African society. She reports the following based on research conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation:

Social scientists have considered this possibility for a number of years. As time passes, generations change and the lived memory of apartheid fades, will historically defined racial identities be overtaken by stronger associations built around income and class? Some seem to think this is happening already, including a number of participants in a qualitative study conducted by the IJR [Institute for Justice and Reconciliation] in 2011. One explained, ‘before we had social classes that were based on race. Today we have classes based on your social status. How much money you have.’ This is an important finding, and one that both provokes interesting debate and guarantees us real estate on newspaper front pages.

In view of the above, respected educationist Jonathan Jansen remarks that the socioeconomic arrangements in the country favour greater inequality over time, but that “[t]he growing inequality will be based on class rather than race...” (Jansen 2012b, 15). In consideration of the above, Lefko-Everett et al (2011, 19) are probably correct in their analysis that most citizens continue to support the goal of national unification, despite strong associations with other identity groups based on language, ethnicity and race. Thus, in terms of political risk, this probably points towards the need for new consideration of a more inclusive and tolerant national identity, while at the same time realising the significance of inequality based on class as a factor of considerable political risk.

**Trade Union Activism and Labour Policy**

Venter (2005, 41) stated that union activism was the one potentially serious societal political risk that remains an issue in the post-apartheid state, and which is as relevant in 2013 as before. The political dynamics of this variable revolve around the fact that the governing ANC is in a long-term historical alliance with the black-dominated trade union, Cosatu. Therefore, the ANC government has been sensitive to trade union pressure, although quite visible tensions between the government and the trade unions have been the order of the day (Venter 2005, 41).

From an international point of view, views are mixed on the recent violence witnessed from some strikes in the mining industry. While some South Africans may view the strikes as natural, given South Africa’s history of labour unrest, perceptions in the international business community are that the country’s labour law system has failed South Africans. Others have adopted a wait-and-see attitude (Mittner 2012, 23).
Generally, many commentators seem to support the view that the Marikana dynamics have brought a new dimension to the challenge of labour unrest in South Africa. The observations of Oppelt (2012, 5) are especially instructive:

We’ve heard the call to strike from unions more times than we care to remember, seen the news flash evidence of ‘rampaging’ workers and listened to the threats that the mother of all strikes would be unleashed on us... But this time things have gone awry. Marikana and the gunfire broadcast on our flat screens on August 16 changed all of that.

Of great concern in regard to the violence that occurred at some of the above-mentioned strikes in the mining industry, is that the wage agreements negotiated by the majority union were basically unilaterally terminated by the labour force. This has sparked one of South Africa’s most widely respected mining executives and CEO of Exxaro, Sipho Nkosi, to state that the rule of law was shaken by the dynamics at Lonmin’s Marikana mine. The situation basically boiled down to a case where “wage agreements no longer seemed worth the paper they were written on” (Barron 2013, 3).

With reference to South Africa’s labour legislation, Venter (2005, 44-45) observed a marked increase in the regulatory environment for businesses since 2000. More measures that are bureaucratic were put into place with regard to the protection of workers, resulting in a perception among investors that labour laws are inflexible; that the labour force is overprotected by the law; and that labour productivity is low. Also, organised labour has constantly been driven by the view that greater state intervention in the economy is needed. Where elements in government have attempted to critically assess and deal with inflexibility in South Africa’s labour legislation, such attempts have been met with fierce reaction from the labour unions. Thus, Oppelt (2012, 5) rightly observes that

[Finance Minister] Pravin Gordhan is truly a brave man for sticking his neck out (not once, but twice) on the need to revisit South Africa’s labour legislation. The first time he did so, last August – in the context of unacceptably high levels of unemployment – he became a target of insults and vitriol from the unions. Then he was called a right-winger, and Irvin Jim said he would ask President Jacob Zuma to fire him.

The drift of this criticism should certainly be a cause for concern. According to the latest World Competitiveness Report from the World Economic Forum, South Africa dropped from the previous year and ranks 113th for labour market efficiency. It ranks 143rd for its rigid hiring and firing hiring-and-firing practices, 140th for lack of inflexibility in wage determination by companies, and 144th for significance of tensions in labour relations (Shevel 2012).
Macro-Political and -Economic Circumstances

Venter (2005, 46-49) analysed the macro-political circumstances in South Africa in the mid-2000s in terms of four sub-variables: income tax; structural problems in the economy; some macroeconomic indicators; and the ability to attract foreign direct investment. In brief, firstly he contended that personal income tax and company tax, by international standards, were high. Secondly, he argued that South Africa experienced a number of serious structural problems in its economy relating to issues such as trained human capital, a low savings rate and a comparably low productivity rate. Thirdly, he attended to the country’s fiscal and monetary policies, which he described as “defensible”. Lastly, he attended to South Africa’s ability to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Importantly, he argued that the Government was prudent and pragmatic in macroeconomic management since 1994, but that elements in the ANC alliance, specifically Cosatu, were decidedly anti-business in their political economic approach.

Without going into much detail, based on the above-mentioned variables, it could be argued that little has changed since the mid-2000s. Firstly, as far as tax rates in South Africa are concerned, Steenkamp (2012, 1-2) correctly points out that the country is characterised by large income and taxable income inequality. This is clear from the fact that in 2010, the taxable income share of the top 10 per cent of the population was 47 per cent and that of the top 1 per cent of taxpayers approximately 18 per cent. In comparable international context, this means that a heavy tax burden is highly concentrated in a narrow tax bracket.

Secondly, as far as pertinent structural problems in the economy are concerned, schooled labour and trained human capital are among the most serious challenges in present-day South Africa. Furthermore, according to research conducted by Adcorp, a JSE-listed human capital management group, labour productivity – defined as making the most of limited resources, and identified as a paramount economic goal – has “from the 1993 peak... fallen by a steep 41%” in 2012 (Moneyweb 2012; Mail & Guardian 2012b). Without going into detail on calculating labour productivity, and accepting the fact that there are differences over the measuring of productivity in South Africa, analysts are mostly in agreement that the public sector is suffering much more from poor labour productivity than the private sector (News24 2012).

Thirdly, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) stated in its 2012 report on South Africa that the country has a stable and resilient economy but one that could do much better. The IMF downgraded South Africa's growth forecast to 2.6 per cent for 2012 and to 3.4 per cent for 2013. The IMF attributes the downturn in the economy to the ongoing debt crisis in Europe, South Africa's main regional trading partner. The report highlights external risks facing the country, especially a slowdown in the Chinese economy, but perhaps more importantly, also identifies certain domestic risks. These include lingering external competitiveness problems, a growing public sector wage bill, and the need to create more labour-intensive growth.
The IMF commends South Africa's fiscal and monetary policy approach. The country’s fiscal stance has a stimulating effect on the local economy, given a weak external demand and a negative output gap. However, the report cited the country's growing public sector wage bill as a concern. The IMF further considers South Africa's flexible exchange rate as an important shock absorber, helping to smooth the impact of external shocks. At the same time, the IMF cited various indicators pointing to ongoing problems with external competitiveness as a result of high domestic costs of production, including unit labour costs. Not surprisingly, the IMF also argues that the country needs to take more action to create labour-intensive growth (SouthAfrica.info 2012).

Officially, the South African government is firmly committed to increase the quality and magnitude of foreign and domestic direct investment and to undertake effective investment recruitment campaigns through its Department of Trade and Industry (Department of Trade and Industry 2012). Yet, the ANC’s alliance partner, Cosatu, takes a sceptical and even antagonistic view of foreign-ownership in South Africa which they describe as “deeply embedded in the global networks of monopoly capital” and “a function of the class forces that manipulate the mineral sector” in South Africa. This reiterates the above-mentioned assertion that elements in the ANC alliance, (Cosatu inclusive), are decidedly anti-business in their approach.

Administrative (In)competence in Government
Fouché (2003, 37) explains that the less responsive a government may be to its citizenry, the more likely it is to fall, either peacefully in a democratic system or violently in a repressive society. In this context, Venter (2005, 50) viewed administrative incompetence in the public sector during the mid-2000s as a significant political risk for investors in South Africa – an observation that coincided with riots at local government level due to poor governmental performance.

As already intimated, dissatisfaction with municipalities have increased considerably over the past decade. The National Development Plan of 2012 notes that the delivery protests that rocked the country in recent years, partly stem from citizens’ frustrations with a state that is unresponsive. The document admits that South Africa has struggled to achieve constructive relations between local, provincial and national government. It is also acknowledged that a lack of clarity about the division of responsibilities together with a reluctance to manage the system has created instability and institutional tension across all three tiers of government. What is also of concern is the lack of leadership in identifying appropriate solutions and the lack of consensus on how this should be resolved (South African Government Information 2012).

The National Development Plan also states that municipalities in particular, are often unable to respond effectively because they do not have sufficient data, or even the required skills to analyse available data. In fact, most municipalities lack an understanding of their indigent
communities. Furthermore, their lack of financial and human capacity to plan for population dynamics is compounded by ineffective intergovernmental coordination on planning and service delivery (South African Government Information 2012; Makhanya 2012, 4).

In view of the above, Makhanya (2012, 4) rightly argues that the proposals in the National Development Plan will come to naught if South Africa does not “get the state of our state right. This calls for courage on the part of our governors. But they must know they do not have a choice. The alternative sends shivers down the spine”. It therefore stands to reason that an abnegation of the proposals of the National Development Plan signals a high measure of political risk for South Africa.

The Security of Property and the Discourse on Nationalisation

Under the heading, the security of private property, Venter (2005, 51-52) specifically focused on the issue of land reform in South Africa. He pointed out that the government had intimated that agricultural land reform was too slow and that the “willing buyer willing seller” principle had not rendered the required success or outcomes. The impression was created that the government could use its power to expropriate land voluntarily. This raised fears in general about the security of private property while the government’s commitment to the respect of private property was sometimes in doubt.

Little has changed in the country since Venter first propounded these arguments in the mid-2000s. Moreover, some elements in the ANC alliance started an ideological debate on the nationalisation of the mining industry – something that has been a major political issue at the ANC’s national policy conference in July 2012 in Gauteng. It fact, the debate on nationalisation (of the mining industry) took centre stage at the conference (Kgosana, Ngalwa and Matlala 2012, 1). This followed several pronouncements and a formal submission by the ANC Youth League to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mining that the nationalisation of mines in South Africa should be driven by a state-owned mining company, which should take ownership and control of a minimum of 60 per cent of the existing privately owned mining corporations (ANC Youth League 2011).

The twin issues of agricultural land reform and the nationalisation of the mining industry are critically important in any political risk analysis of present-day South Africa. Generally, many informed opinion makers in South Africa would be in full agreement with the following editorial comment in South Africa’s biggest Sunday newspaper, the Sunday Times: “The dithering of [ANC] party bosses on an issue [nationalisation] that the ANC began debating in 1992, has already cost South Africa millions of rands in potential investment and potential jobs. Investors are not willing to pour their money into a country and industry where there is so much policy uncertainty” (Sunday Times Editorial Staff 2012: 4).
The ANC’s most recent national conference in Mangaung (Bloemfontein) in December 2012, seems, however, to have brought a bit more clarity on these issues. The ANC ditched the concept of "strategic nationalisation" of the mining industry in favour of "strategic state ownership" in the mining sector through equity, using a state-owned mining company as its facilitating vehicle. The ANC also embraced the government’s National Development Plan, which is considered by the business community as a positive blueprint aimed at boosting growth and reducing unemployment. In this context, the conference also did not signal anything that points towards antagonism against the business community. In fact, the policy platform of the ANC looks more investor and business friendly than had generally been anticipated ahead of its elective conference in Mangaung, rating agency Moody’s Investors Service said after the conference (Isa 2012). However, plans on agricultural land reform are still largely undecided and somewhat uncertain.

**Conclusion**

It can be argued that little has changed in South Africa since the mid-2000s as far as the broad macro-political risk image of the country is concerned (compare Venter 2005). Serious political risks – such as war, revolution, a coup d'état, hostile neighbours, military involvement in politics and violent racial or ethnic conflict – remain relatively low. Far more crucial in the South African context, is the political risk posed by social and political-economic variables as argued in the discussion above. In fact, social risk in the form of violent service delivery protests have markedly increased since the mid-2000s and must be cited as a factor of the highest concern in any consideration of forces and future events that could negatively influence investor confidence. Another factor spelling high social risk is that of extremely high levels of unemployment, which coincide with low levels of education and unschooled labour in South Africa. Certainly, youth unemployment remains one of South Africa’s most acute challenges and this must be factored into in any discussion on South Africa’s future political landscape.

Furthermore, a number of other factors also pose significant political risk. These pertain to a lack of solid and visionary political leadership; corruption; inefficient government administration, especially at municipal level; a rigid business environment and inflexible labour policy; and finally, policy uncertainty on the role of the government in the mining industry and agricultural land reform. This being said, indications are that more clarity can be expected in the near future on how the ANC as governing party will approach the mining industry.

The most recent ANC national conference (December 2012) has not given any indication of any anti-business sentiments, but investors are likely to remain “cautious” (see Venter 2005) on investing in South Africa. The ANC government will probably continue to drive down the cataclysmic political risks in the country – as it has done over the last decade – but the question remains whether the state is suitably positioned to carry out government’s political intentions.
Against this background opinions among top business leaders vary from perspectives such that “South African politics has always been volatile” (Harris, 2012) to more assertive and concerned voices that “government should get the basic functions of government working” (Cutifani 2012, 5). The latter view is premised on the conviction that for South Africa to become competitive in today’s rapidly expanding global environment, much more should be done by government, business and labour to create the right environment for economic growth, foreign investment, thriving businesses, and job creation (see Cutifani, 2012, 5).

In the final instance, the violence associated with recent labour unrest, specifically the events at Marikana and De Doorns, has evoked distinctly negative reactions, although there is no sense of doom and gloom (see Mittner 2012, 23). Based on the above analysis, it seems that South Africa probably remains in the medium risk category. However, Clem Sunter’s argument that South Africa is at a tipping point in terms of its future and that the country has a 50:50 chance to continue playing in the “Premier League” (as opposed to the “Second Division) is certainly worth pondering. The question whether South Africa as Africa’s number one economy is poised to move on to the next level of ‘high medium risk’, will in future undoubtedly remain a point of discussion for political analysts and role-players who have an interest in contemporary political risk in South Africa.

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Japan’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Southern Africa. The Quest for Peace or Prestige?

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Abstract
Peace and security within the African continent seems to be the result of weak interdependent factors. UN peacekeeping operations are one of the most fundamental tools to promote and maintain peace in a continent vulnerable to recurrent wars and conflicts. During the post-Cold War period, the southern African region, while observing increasing instability and conflict, hosted large-scale UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although geographically and politically distant from Africa, Japan decided to engage with the southern African region in its initial international peace cooperation assignments, based on a unique set of peace-related values. This paper aims at providing an assessment of the Japanese engagement and contributions to peace and security in the southern African region and how the promotion of and engagement with peace-related policies in Africa may improve Japan’s level of influence, attraction, and reputation within the international community.

Background
Africa has been particularly exposed to conflict and war, a factor that triggered the involvement of external actors with the region’s peace and security issues. The extent and human costs of conflicts in Africa are particularly exposed by the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as underlined by Hawkins (2008, 24-25), “the conflict in the DRC is by far the deadliest conflict in the world in recent years. In fact, it is possibly the deadliest conflict in the world since World War II, … and is the deadliest conflict in recorded African history.” If we expand this analysis to a continental level, the trends are also clear. Africa has been host to the vast majority (88 percent) of conflict-related deaths. The only non-African conflicts that can be found among the world’s ten deadliest conflicts are Afghanistan and Iraq (Hawkins 2008, 25).

Problems with peace and security within the African continent seem to be the result of weak interdependent cause and effect links, with many factors, past and present, contributing “not least”, according to Esther Pan (2005) “the continent's history of colonialism and conflict”.
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War coincided with the collapse of state institutions in countries like Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and the Congo (DRC). Disputes over natural resources led to armed conflict that evolved into guerilla warfare involving mercenaries, warlords, militias, and child soldiers. A massive influx of weapons and small arms from Eastern Europe in the 1990s fed the conflict (Pan 2005).

When analyzing peace and security in Africa, it seems also relevant to take into consideration the causal nexus between the structure and the behavior of the actors or political units within the international system. Today’s international distribution of power and global order still configures a system headed by the United States, along with rising powers like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). Despite the emergence of new powers, the current global order may endure for the next coming decades with relevant implications for peace and security issues within the African continent.

Monteiro (2012) recently laid out a theory of unipolarity that accounts for how a unipolar structure of the international system provides significant incentives for conflict. The disengagement of the hegemon power with Africa is one of the factors making the region more vulnerable to conflict.

The unipole, … could pursue offensive dominance in one region, defensive dominance in another, and disengagement from yet another. For instance, between 1990 and 2001, the United States implemented a strategy of defensive dominance everywhere except in Africa, from which it largely disengaged after withdrawing from Somalia in 1994 (Monteiro 2012, 22).

More evidence of the continuity of the US disengagement with Africa can be found in the number of visits of the former US Secretary of State to different regions in the globe. In her first three years in office, Secretary Hillary Clinton visited 36 countries, including some more than once, and Africa was the region least visited by the US Secretary of State (Manyin 2012, 17). The path taken from the unipole’s strategy and the current structure may make the African continent more vulnerable to conflicts.

The vacuum of power that emerged from the post-Cold War US disengagement with Africa underlines the importance of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) in terms of promoting peace and security in Africa. Taking the year of 2008 as a sample, more than half of the peace operations in Africa were conducted by the UN. One of these was the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), conducted along with the African Union (AU). In 2008, the UN accounted for 88 per cent of all peace operation personnel on the continent, and around 70 per cent of all UN mission personnel were located in Africa. The United Nations’ total deployments in the region increased tenfold between 1999 and 2008. Other organizations
conducting or leading missions in Africa were the AU, the European Union (EU), and the Economic Community of the Central African States (CEEAC) (Sodder 2009).

It is under these circumstances, resulting from the post-Cold War environment, that Japan attempted to contribute to peace and security in Africa and simultaneously improve its prestige among the international community. Tokyo’s policies regarding peace and security issues have been formulated within the limitations imposed by its constitution and the legal framework provided by the “Law Concerning the Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” (the International Peace Cooperation Law) enacted in June 1992. Under this framework, Japan underlines the role of the United Nations as the main institution to promote peace and security worldwide. The 1992 law establishes the three pillars of Japan’s international peace cooperation: 1) Participation in UN peacekeeping operations; 2) contribution to international humanitarian relief operations and 3) contributions to international election observation operations.

The International Peace Cooperation Law also stipulates that Japan’s peacekeeping operations shall be carried out according to five principles: 1) agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts; 2) consent to the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts; 3) the operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts; 4) should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps shall suspend International Peace Cooperation Assignments (unless the requirements cease to be satisfied again in the short term, the Government of Japan shall terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments) and; 5) the use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc (Government of Japan 2010, 1).

Unlike other national structures on International Peace Cooperation, which traditionally underline the Ministry of Defense as the main domestic institution that deals with peacekeeping operations, Japan conducts its International Peace Cooperation Assignments in accordance with implementation plans drawn up under its unique structure. The International Peace Cooperation Headquarters is situated within the Cabinet office to administer Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations and other related contributions. Headed by the Prime Minister, the Headquarters has a deputy chief, members, and the Secretariat. In addition, in order to conduct International Peace Cooperation Assignments and other activities, International Peace Cooperation Corps are set up for a specified time in accordance with each implementation plan. The members of the International Peace Cooperation Corps are selected by screening volunteers or dispatched from the administrative organs concerned. After receiving training by the
Secretariat, they undertake International Peace Cooperation Assignments, including peacekeeping operations (Government of Japan 2010, 4).

Japan’s actual participation in peacekeeping operations seem to be rather weak when compared, for example, with Tokyo’s efforts on Official Development Assistance (ODA) towards Africa or other major powers’ contributions to peace and security in Africa. However, Japan appears to be gradually seeking a stronger role on contemporary international peace cooperation and security issues. The current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, since taking power in December 2012, has promised an increase in Japan's defense budget and a boost in the size of Japan's military personnel. Moreover, he intends to ease its domestic laws that severely limit the operational scope of its military. Such a change will allow Japanese troops to fire at enemy forces if friendly troops came under fire during peacekeeping operations (Hayashi 2013). This could give Japan a more prominent role in peacekeeping operations, therefore increasing its global influence in peace and security issues.

Conflict in the southern African region may not directly affect Japan’s security interests. However, Tokyo aims at reaffirming itself as a global player and find allies within international institutions to fulfill its international ambitions, such as becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It seems therefore important to analyze the interrelatedness between the causal and motivational links and the effective outcomes of the Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations in such a far away region from Japan as southern Africa.

**Japan’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Southern Africa**

Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations in southern Africa seems to be the result of Tokyo’s intentions to improve its international prestige and regional influence during the post-Cold War period. However, the relatively small-scale deployments and its limitations in terms of its ability to engage have also produced weak outcomes. In fact, Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations has long suffered from an underlying tension between the country’s engagement with multilateralism, through the UN, and its political values that urge for the renunciation of military force. It was only in 1992, during the post-Cold War period, that the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan managed to implement the International Peace Cooperation Law, therefore enabling the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad (Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya 1999).

Japan’s initial engagement with UN peacekeeping operations included peace cooperation assignments in Angola, Mozambique and the former Zaire. In the context of Japan’s initial contributions to peacekeeping operations, the relevance of the promotion of peace and security within the southern African region was underlined. However, its initial engagements were not confined to southern Africa. Due to Japan’s regional sphere of interests, promoting peace and security in Asia was also one of its main priorities. In September 1992, under the new law, Japan
Japan’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Southern Africa

sent approximately 600 SDF construction unit personnel, 80 military observers, 75 civilian police monitors and 41 civilian election monitors to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operations.

The engagement with southern Africa was initially seen cautiously not only by policymakers but also by the Japanese public that was naturally averse to military operations or related missions. In May 1993, Japan sent more than 150 SDF personnel to the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Initially, the Japanese government was resistant to the idea of dispatching SDF to Mozambique, but the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) promoted and pushed through this idea into an effective contribution. In this context, a Japanese government official informally said:

The participation in Cambodia’s PKO alone is not enough for Japan. It is something like graduating from college with minimum requirements. In order to come up to the standard mark in the international community, Japan must participate in at least two UN peacekeeping operations simultaneously (Ochiai 2001, 41).

The first Japanese contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, although it didn't involve SDF personnel, was within the southern African region. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) observed and verified the presidential and legislative elections held in Angola on 29-30 September 1992. Japan dispatched three election observers, one each from the national government, local government, and private sector, to assist this mission. The Japanese observers worked together with an observer from another country in their assigned area for checking any dual voting or election disturbance, monitoring the elections (Government of Japan 2010, 11).

In the context of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), approximately 200 personnel from various countries served as staff officers in the northern, central, and southern parts of the country. Japan dispatched a total of 10 SDF personnel as staff officers to the headquarters of ONUMOZ. Two staff officers were assigned to the general headquarters in Maputo, one to the southern regional headquarters in Matola, and two to the central regional headquarters in Beira. These officers helped ONUMOZ to prepare medium and long term operating plans and to plan and coordinate transport operations. Japan also dispatched three movement control units of 48 SDF personnel each, 144 personnel in total, between 1993 and 1995.

Working with a multinational team of peacekeepers, Japan’s movement control units primarily coordinated the entry and exit of people and cargo at airports and harbors. Finally, the Japanese contribution to ONUMOZ included 15 election observers, sent between 27-29 October 1994, to cooperate in the holding of presidential and legislative elections. The observers
comprised 3 national government officials, 1 local government official, and 11 individuals from the private sector. The Japanese personnel were tasked with contributing to the monitoring and ensuring of fair elections in Mozambique (Government of Japan 2010, 15-16).

The country’s participation in ONUMOZ attracted less attention from the Japanese government and the Japanese people when compared with the Cambodian operation. Few Japanese had knowledge or interest about Mozambique. The operation was relatively safe, although there were some frictions between the political forces in Maputo, which resulted in postponing the Mozambican elections twice. There was a relatively small element of risk, this in a region of less relevance for Japan. The Mozambican mission ended up largely ignored in Japan (Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya 1999, 26-27).

In the second half of 1994, Japan had the opportunity to participate in its first humanitarian relief operation under the International Peace Cooperation Law. Japan sent two teams of refugee relief units with 283 members in total to the aid of Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire. Both units were composed of Ground SDF personnel, who engaged with medical activities, helped build roads at refugee camps and provided logistical support, in response to requests from local aid organizations. Working under extremely difficult conditions and adversities, the medical care personnel treated a total of approximately 2,100 outpatients and performed about 70 medical surgeries. Along with the refugee relief units, an Air SDF unit transported Japanese personnel and supplies in the C-130H transport planes between Nairobi in Kenya and Goma in the former Zaire. This unit also transported personnel and supplies for the UNHCR and NGOs conducting relief operations (Government of Japan 2010, 18-19). The Japanese contribution to the Rwandan operation was the result of the UNHCR director, Sadako Ogata’s efforts and appeals to the Japanese government which was first reluctant but finally agreed to send the SDF to assist this mission. The 283-person SDF first contingent arrived after the most intense moments of the Rwandan refugee tragedy occurred, but it did provide vital services while the lightly armed Japanese soldiers were a reassuring presence (Heinrich, Shibata and Soeya 1999, 29).

The last time Japan contributed to peacekeeping activities within the southern African region was during the presidential and legislative elections conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on July 30, 2006. At the request of the UN, Japan sent 13 election observers to these elections, which included two rounds of voting. During these two missions, the Japanese observers, mainly in Kinshasa, carried out observations at various stages of the election process, including the campaign, preparations for the polling day, voting, and counting (Government of Japan 2010, 33).

The 2011 Diplomatic Bluebook points out the Japanese commitment in working for peace and stability, advancing various cooperation measures for the consolidation of peace in Africa:
Japan also provided election support and dispatched election observation teams to support the democratization process in such countries as Burundi and Tanzania. In addition, Japan continued to provide support for peacekeeping operations training centers in Africa to increase the peacekeeping capability of African countries (MOFA 2011, 16).

The funds provided by Japan to peacekeeping training centers in Africa, including the center located in South Africa, are used to train the personnel involved with the six current UN peacekeeping operations and one Africa Union operation in the continent. This consists of an important but cautious contemporary contribution to peace and security issues in the region, including southern Africa.

In the post-Cold War period, Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations continues to be undertaken with caution and deliberation. During the early 1990s, Japan seemed to have demonstrated a clear intention of promoting peacekeeping operations in southern Africa, a region that was particularly vulnerable to conflict and insecurity, a region that still faces today one of the major world conflicts in the DRC. As represented in figure 1, after an initial engagement with and commitment to peace and security in the region from 1992 to 1995, it seems that the efforts and contributions of Japan to peace and security in southern Africa clearly diminished.

![Graph: Deployment of Japanese Personnel in UN PKO in Southern Africa (1992 - 2013)](image)

*Figure 1: Sources: UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, Inoue, 2011*
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the only peacekeeping operation in the southern African region since the late 1990s has been in the DRC. Therefore, if Japan were to engage in peacekeeping operations in the southern African region since the 2000s, the DRC would be the only choice available.

The implementation of peace-related policies in the southern African region during the 1990’s aimed at leveraging Tokyo’s influence, attraction, and reputation within the international community. Promoting human rights, peace and security in southern Africa could be a win-win situation for Japan and the region, if effective, continuous and successful outcomes were produced as a result of such engagement. However, Japan’s initial contribution to peacekeeping operations in southern Africa seem to be closely related with a strategy more focused on Japan’s intentions to leverage its international prestige than a strategy focused on expected outcomes in terms of peace and security in the region.

The abovementioned constitutional limitations on the projection of Japan’s hard power resources resulted in the unbalanced prioritization of prestige over an effective engagement with the promotion of peace within the southern African region. Additionally, considerations over the security of Japanese personnel in peacekeeping operations within the southern African region\(^1\), namely in the DRC, along with the lack of political interest in the region when compared with the engagement with other regions, notably Asia (see figure 2, chart 1), resulted in a tenuous engagement with peace and security in the region after 1995. This also resulted in a disharmony with the priorities of the United Nations peacekeeping operations deployments, the majority of them in the African region (see figure 2, chart 2).

**Japan’s Quest for Effective Peace or International Prestige?**

Japan’s initial post-Cold War attempt to increase its international prestige and reputation with its participation in peacekeeping operations in southern Africa, seems to be in harmony with an increasing importance of soft power strategies in contemporary international politics. If the official policies of nations like Japan are consistent with peace, democracy, human rights, openness, and respect for others’ opinions, they will benefit from the trends of this new global information age, enhancing their level of attractiveness, and ultimately maximizing their power (Nye 2005, 31-32).

The new public diplomacy niche presents an innovative approach, through the dissemination of information to the general public and coordination of press relations. Constructive dialogue with foreign audiences is now a condition of success in foreign policy (Mellissen 2007, 13). This dialogue may address international norms, peace and security or human-centered policies.

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\(^1\) Interview with a Japanese Government Official at Japan’s Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, July 18, 2012.
Japan’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Southern Africa

Deployment of Japanese PKO Personnel by Region 2000 - 2010
Chart 1

Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region in 2010
Chart 2

Figure 2 \ Sources: Insee, 2011

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Another concept of relevance and scope for some policymakers today is ‘nation-branding’, defined as “the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences (Dinnie 2009, 15).” Within the brand identity components it’s possible to underline the ideology that each country advocates. The nation-brand manifestation of a country like Japan seems to be in harmony with peace-related values, human rights, and sustainable development (Dinnie 2009, 44). Acknowledging this tool while attempting to compete on the global stage, may give relative advantages to countries attempting to successfully communicating with foreign publics or negotiating with other nations.

Japan’s post Cold War engagement with international peace cooperation in Africa seemed to follow the idea that the most common form of deploying states’ hard-power resources in soft-power settings is through UN peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless those contributions are often not enough to serve as an effective means for the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Nye (2007) underlines that “while there are currently more than 100,000 troops from various nations serving in UN peacekeeping missions around the world, member states are not providing adequate resources, training, and equipment.”

Japan seems to recognize that engaging with UN peacekeeping operations constitutes a valuable opportunity to enhance its international influence and prestige, which will therefore result in a relative advantage while negotiating with other countries, or appealing for votes at multilateral institutions. However, after an initial post-Cold War attempt to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations in the southern Africa region, Japan’s contemporary engagement seems to be cautious and hesitant.

In fact, contemporary Japan is facing increasing challenges and it may need to define a foreign policy strategy that underlines its political values in a soft power context. The 21st century is considered by many to be the Asian Century. At the same time, politically it’s possible to observe a loss of democratic momentum, with the loss of credibility of Europe and the US as global models. This came along with the growing appeal in some parts of the world, including Africa, of China’s and Russia’s versions of “authoritarian capitalism”, offering an alternative to the Western model for developing or transitional countries. Indeed, China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers are asserting an increasing international political influence in a way that works against the spread of democracy (Carothers 2012). While we observe the rise of China and other autocracies in Asia, Japan stands out in the region, holding political values clearly aligned with the promotion of international peace, democracy and the universality of human rights.

The formulation of Japan’s international public policies seems to be clearly influenced by a triangulation between human rights, human security and peace-related values, giving Japanese security and foreign policy a unique character and an hybrid structure, mixing realist elements connected with the country’s national interest, and idealist elements related with human-centered
and peace-related principles. This not only benefits Japan’s reputation, image, and level of attractiveness, but also, eventually, the international protection of human rights and the promotion of democratic and peace-related values within the international society.

The post-World War II Japanese constitution, as the main normative text for the formulation of policies in Japan, indicates the existence of strong pacifist norms among the Japanese people, as well as the respect for human rights and the commitment to human security through the promotion of freedom from fear and freedom from want:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. (Japan 1947)

The preamble of the constitution clearly states the importance of peace, human rights and human security. The article 9, unique to Japan when compared with any other constitutional framework, underlines the commitment to peace-related values, renouncing war and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes (Japan 1947). When these norms were translated into customary practices within the Japanese policymaking process, various self-restraining measures were imposed on Tokyo’s security and defense policy.

The ‘three non-nuclear principles’ are a strong example of the commitment with peace-related values: Japan decided not to possess, manufacture or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory. These principles came along with the ban on arms exports and the introduction of a 1 percent of GDP limit on defense spending. In addition, Tokyo has refrained from acquiring ‘offensive’ weapons as long-range strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Some of these restrictions are currently open to debate or different interpretations, yet the fact that the Japanese government had to introduce them to justify or rationalize its security and defense policy is indicative of the existence of a strong consideration about peace-related values among the Japanese people (Miyashita 2007, 104).

Despite these unique values displayed along with a unique normative and institutional structure, cultural and legal limitations prevent a deeper commitment with UN peacekeeping operations, like the constitutional and legal constraints that result from the interpretation of Article 9, and strong anti-militarism in domestic politics. In addition, there is a strong Japanese public opinion dominated by deep remorse about the pre-WWII militarism, as well as the public resistance to debating issues related to military, security or war (Berger 1998). This seems to be
changing of late, however, given the emergence of China, the North Korean threat and the election in 2012 of the new Abe administration.

Since 9/11, Japan has taken significant steps towards loosening legal restrictions on the SDF’s overseas missions. Despite these changes, the possibilities for the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions are still limited to traditional peacekeeping missions and peace support operations, and Tokyo remains reluctant to commit troops to peacekeeping operations (Stengel, p. 51), particularly in the southern African region.

In the ‘Interim Report of the Study Group on Japan’s Engagement in UN Peacekeeping Operations’ (2011), the Japanese government recognized the need for the country to reengage with its commitments to international peace cooperation and UN peacekeeping operations in particular:

With the further strengthening of international interdependency as a result of the advancement of globalization, there has been an increasing number of cases in which some form of confusion arising even in a country geographically far removed from Japan has substantial political and economic impacts on Japan's national interests. For example, if the situation becomes unstable in the Middle East or Africa, both of which regions are rich in energy resources, the ensuing instability in the energy supply will have an enormous adverse effect on the Japanese economy. The safety and prosperity of Japan, which is open to the world, can only be secured based on the peace and stability of the international community (Government of Japan 2011).

In fact, Japanese interests in southern Africa go beyond security. The relationship between Tokyo and the region evolved from perceptions related with geographical distance, cultural gap and lack of historical ties, to one of considerable economic and political ties. South Africa, for example, has become strategically vital for the Japanese economy, supplying the country with twenty-eight principal minerals, along with agricultural commodities and foodstuffs. Moreover, the southern African region is becoming unavoidably relevant for any actor with the ambition of engaging with Africa. SADC represents 40 percent of Africa’s population, 81 percent of Africa’s GDP, 81 percent of Africa’s total imports and 80 percent of Africa’s exports. Therefore the region is highly attractive for foreign investment and the implementation of cooperation projects with Japan (Alden and Hirano 2003, 108).

An increased participation of Japan in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in the southern African region would simultaneously allow Tokyo to reaffirm its global role. The abovementioned report underlines that:

Japan's active participation in UN peacekeeping operations and other joint efforts of the international community for maintaining and promoting a peaceful environment, contributes to securing the
national interests of Japan, whose destiny is to coexist with the world as a whole. In view of its national strength and its position and influence in the international community as well, Japan has the responsibility to lead such efforts and to play an active role, making full use of its capacity (Government of Japan 2011, 6).

This statement presumes the acknowledgement of the interrelation between the promotion of international peace and security, even in distant regions like southern Africa, and the Japanese national interest.

Considering the benefits to Japan’s global prestige and reputation that result from holding such an engagement with peace-related principles and policies, it is necessary for Tokyo to live up to its ideals in order to make international peace cooperation mutually beneficial and effective to not only Japan’s national interest but also the conflict or post-conflict affected areas.

Indeed, southern Africa seems to be an important case study due to its exposure to conflict and war. It is also a region rich in mineral resources, and it holds considerable political and economic importance. Additionally it represents an important source for votes in international institutions, particularly important to Japan and its quest for permanent membership in the Security Council.

During the post-Cold War period, the southern African region, while observing increasing instability and conflict, hosted large-scale UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). An assessment of the Japanese engagement and contributions to peace and security in this region may show that the quest for prestige was prioritized over an effective contribution over peace. Showing the uniqueness of Japanese political values through international peace cooperation missions seems not to be enough to have an effective impact in peace and security issues in the region.

Japan’s lack of direct contributions to the peacekeeping operations in the DRC is at the core of the current disengagement with southern Africa in terms of peace and security issues. The DRC’s new peacekeeping operation United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has been authorized to use all necessary means to ensure the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

Given the scale of the conflict (the world's deadliest), and the implications that peace and security in the DRC have not only for the region but also for the continent and indeed the world, contributions to the peacekeeping operations in that country can constitute a precious opportunity for Japan to show its commitment to peace and security and its engagement in contemporary world affairs. Moreover, taking into consideration the abovementioned Tokyo’s limitations in peacekeeping operations, it may be difficult to engage with the volatile situation in the East of
the DRC. Nevertheless, there are more stable areas inside the country in which the SDF can give important contributions.

Therefore, Tokyo’s lack of engagement with the DRC seems to be the result of a predominant political disinterest in Africa among some Japanese political elites. As one Japanese government official said: “Africa is the last continent we have to concentrate in. Other actors are giving more resources to Africa and it is increasingly difficult to compete with them.” Moreover, the Japanese civil society seems not to have enough information about Africa, consequently having an impact on Japanese foreign policymaking regarding this region. Japanese media often suffers from the *sakoku* (national isolation) syndrome and lacks a cosmopolitan view. In this regard Hawkins (2012) says,

> It is paradoxical that the inward looking and insular nature of the Japanese media persists. The widely held notion that Africa holds little strategic relevance for Japan carries little validity today. … But there remains a powerful perception in Japan of Africa as a part of the world occupying the bottom of geostrategic, socioeconomic and/or racial ‘hierarchies’. … The resulting lack of awareness/familiarity among the public perpetuates the notion that there is little appetite for news on Africa. … In the absence of media and public interest, policymakers have little incentive to engage with the continent in a substantive fashion.

**Conclusion**

Japanese contributions to UN peacekeeping operations in the southern African region seem to be the result of domestic politics and legal constraints, along with the quest for international prestige and reputation through a soft power strategy that prioritized the expression of Japan’s political values in a distant region. Ultimately this can benefit Tokyo’s global aspirations, e.g. garner votes to get a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Nevertheless there seems to be a considerable lack of assertiveness and effective commitment with peace and security within the southern African region and Africa in general, and particularly after 1995. A stronger commitment to the resolution of the conflict in the DRC would reinforce the Japanese contribution to peace and security in southern Africa. That may only be possible if the reinterpretation of the Japanese pacifist constitution allows for “collective self-defense”, therefore being able to protect peacekeepers under attack during UN peacekeeping operations and providing logistical support to other nations engaged in peacekeeping missions.

However, loosening legal constraints will have to be accompanied by a deeper awareness about Africa among Japanese policymakers, among Japanese scholars and Japanese university

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students, the media and the civil society. In a highly globalized word, the neo-isolationist trends observed in Japanese society may result in a civilizational setback with wide implications for Japan’s international and domestic politics. The Japanese government strategy for peace and international prestige can only be successful with an effective engagement and attention of the whole Japanese society to Africa, one of the regions in the world more exposed to war and conflict.

Today, Japan is adapting to new domestic, regional and global challenges, particularly in security related issues like the rising Chinese military budget and the Senkaku dispute or the North Korean threat and the cross-strait issue, along with the US-Asia pivot. While the world is turning its attention to Asia, Japan has an opportunity to reaffirm itself as a global player. Effectively providing for global public goods like international peace and security, while holding a unique set of peace-related values and principles in its foreign policy, reinforces Japan’s influence and reputation within the international community. Engaging with southern Africa and the conflict in the DRC in this context should be a key element in Japan’s strategy. A smart power strategy that balances prestige and peace not only benefits the Japanese national interest in the southern African region, but also allows it to effectively engage in promoting peace and security within the African continent.

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The DRC Peace Process: Rebels Without a Pause, A Peace Agreement with an Escape Clause?

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Introduction
Progress in dealing with the vestiges of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been dismal at best and an unmitigated disaster at worst. It is a conflict situation that has likely generated more peace processes, peace initiatives and peace agreements than many other African conflict situations, and also generated one of the largest number of violations and failures too. The aim of this article is to provide an update on the recent developments in the DRC, particularly efforts to address the continuation of further conflict in the eastern Congo – a region that has remained almost immune to the various prescriptions and remedies that have been introduced to secure peace. The article will also explore the recent UN-led peace efforts, culminating in the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, and the prospects for the success of yet another peace agreement in a conflict that is already saturated with the remnants of other ill-fated and futile attempts. Additionally the article will focus on the continuing presence of rebel groups, most notably the continuing threat posed by the M23 rebellion and how its operations are likely to be affected (if at all) by the renewed peace efforts in the region.

A Rebellion Without a Pause: The Continued Threat of the M23 Rebels
As observed by UN-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,

The eastern DRC continues to be plagued by recurrent waves of conflict, chronic humanitarian crises and serious human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence. Contributing to the cycles of violence has been the continued presence of Congolese and foreign armed groups taking advantage of power and security vacuums in the eastern part of the country… Armed groups continue to constitute the main threat to the security of the population and the general stability of the region and an obstacle to regional cohesion. (UN Security Council 2013, 2; 12)
The *Mouvement du 23 Mars* (M23)\(^1\) rebellion in particular has posed a clear threat to the DRC’s national security. The M23 rebels, a group of army mutineers who launched their offensive after accusing President Joseph Kabila of reneging on the terms of a March 2009 peace agreement, have since broadened their goals to include the removal of Kabila and “liberation” of the country (SAPA 2012). In late November 2012 the M23 rebels vowed to take control of all of the Congo, following their seizure of the strategic city of Goma in eastern Congo (SAPA-AP 2012). The M23 managed to capture the regional Congolese capital of Goma, after the withdrawal of about 2,000 soldiers from the Congolese National Army (FARDC) and 700 Congolese policemen. Goma fell to the rebel group despite the presence of nearly 6,000 armed peacekeepers in the North Kivu province, with over 1,500 in the Goma area alone, under MONUSCO (Roux 2013). The rebels also appeared to have a considerable following amongst segments of the region’s local population, where in Bukavu demonstrations against the Kinshasa government and in support of the rebels were observed by local residents (SAPA-AP 2012). The fall of Goma and the progress made by the M23 rebels prompted emergency talks in neighbouring Uganda, where President Joseph Kabila met with President Paul Kagame. The talks between Kabila and Kagame were being mediated by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. During this particular crisis, speculation was rife that Kabila would be compelled to enter into direct negotiations with the M23 rebels – a position Kabila previously rejected as being an option. The DRC Government was confronted with two relatively straightforward, yet equally unattractive, menu options (neither of which were likely palatable to Kabila) – either talking to, or fighting the rebels.

The operational reach of the M23 rebels also raised alarm. In early February 2013, Cape Town, South Africa became the scene of a sting operation that led to the arrest of the suspected ringleader in a plot to overthrow President Joseph Kabila. This arrest coincided with the arrest in the Limpopo Province of a group of 19 rebels from the DRC (allegedly forming part of the M23 group) on suspicion of running an illegal military operation after an investigation by a crime intelligence unit (SAPA 2013).

The ability of the rebels to sow chaos in the east had also been firmly established. Since the beginning of the M23 rebellion, more than half a million people have been driven from their homes in North Kivu. According to Amnesty International, M23 has been responsible for human

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\(^1\) The *Mouvement du 23 Mars*, or March 23 Movement, came into existence in April 2012, when hundreds of mainly ethnic Tutsi soldiers of FARDC, the national army, mutinied over poor living conditions and poor pay. Most of the mutineers had been members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), another armed group that in 2009 signed a deal with the government, which the dissidents felt Kinshasa had not fully implemented. M23 is named after the date the agreement was signed.
The DRC Peace Process

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rights abuses, including violations of the duty to care for the civilian population when launching attacks, forced recruitment of children to take part in hostilities, unlawful killings, and acts of sexual violence (IRIN News 2013). Additionally, a UN report issued in late-2012 accused Rwanda and Uganda of providing support to the M23 rebels (Jobson 2013). This accusation had further exacerbated tensions in an already highly strained regional relationship.

The eastern DRC’s history with rebel groups and the inability to stem the tide of their destabilization efforts has proven to be the Achilles’ heel of the much-vaunted peace process that has been undertaken since 1999 and beyond. The signing of yet another new peace agreement to address the crisis in the east raises an important question: has the eastern Congo been overwhelmed by far too many peace agreements that has merely duplicated and ‘recycled’ initiatives that were dismal and perhaps even damaging to begin with?

Another Panacea for Peace? The Signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework

The signing on 24 February of the much-vaunted Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region should be greeted with cautious optimism at best, considerable scepticism at worst. Eleven African countries signed the UN-drafted peace deal in Addis Ababa – including the DRC, Angola, Republic of Congo, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan and Zambia. Expectations are that the new framework will bring stability to the country’s war-torn eastern region. The framework aims to address two of the root causes of the conflict in the eastern DRC: the country’s weak and dysfunctional security, justice and governance systems, and the continued interference from neighbouring countries.

Importantly the new peace agreement acknowledged that the eastern DRC has continued to suffer from recurring cycles of conflict and persistent violence by armed groups, both Congolese and foreign. Interestingly, the agreement adopted a somewhat optimistic tone citing that “despite these challenges, the recent crisis has created a window of opportunity to address the root causes of conflict and put an end to recurring cycles of violence” and noting “increasing recognition that the current path is untenable” (AU Peace and Security 2013, 1). The framework also sought to secure a set of renewed commitments from each of the central parties to the conflict. The agreement quite significantly called upon the Government of the DRC to pledge a renewed commitment to continue, and deepen security sector reform, particularly with respect to the army and police, to consolidate state authority, particularly in eastern DRC, including the prevention of armed groups from destabilizing neighbouring countries, and to further the agenda of reconciliation, tolerance and democratization. The framework called upon the region to show a renewed commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, to neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups, to respect the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries, to strengthen regional cooperation, including deepening economic integration with special consideration for the exploitation of natural resources, to respect the legitimate concerns and interests of the neighbouring countries, in particular regarding security matters and to neither harbour nor provide protection of any kind to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts of genocide or crimes of aggression, or persons falling under the United Nations sanctions regime (AU Peace and Security 2013, 3). The Security Council also expressed its intention in the agreement to continue supporting the long-term stability of the DRC and the Great Lakes region, undertaking a strategic review of MONUSCO that aims to strengthen support to the Government to enable it to address security challenges and extend State authority and an appointment of a UN Special Envoy to support efforts to reach durable solutions would be undertaken. (AU Peace and Security 2013, 4).

As an additional measure, a regional oversight mechanism involving the 11 signatory countries’ leadership, with the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, Chairperson of the AU Commission, Chairperson of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and the Chairperson of SADC in the role of guarantors (11+4 mechanism), shall be established to meet regularly and review progress in the implementation of the regional commitments outlined in the agreement, while also stressing the need to respect the national sovereignty of the states concerned. The 11+4 mechanism is in support of the ongoing regional efforts and shall therefore be supported by and closely linked to the AU, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, SADC and other international partners, including the European Union (EU), Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Another interesting inclusion in the agreement called upon President Joseph Kabila to put in place, within the Government of the DRC, a national oversight mechanism in order to accompany and oversee the implementation of the national commitments for reform as outlined in the agreement, with the commensurate support of the UN, AU, World Bank, African Development Bank and other bilateral and multilateral partners of the DRC. An additional stipulation was that the national oversight mechanism would operate in full respect of the national sovereignty of the DRC. (AU Peace and Security 2013, 5). Some initial reflection and critique of the agreement is warranted.

There remains a lingering doubt that genuine trust and mutual respect for sovereignty can be secured in this overall toxic climate and poisoned atmosphere in which the parties have continued to operate. Whether the latest agreement will withstand what is likely to be many tests of endurance also remains to be seen. In particular whether the new framework delivers anything substantially different that could infuse the peace process with new vigour and a sense that a major breakthrough is achievable this time round to that of previous failed attempts at peace seems doubtful. The omission of the rebels and their leadership and representatives as signatories of the framework agreement could prove to be the agreement’s Achilles’ heel. Their exclusion from what is being touted as a viable framework to bring stability to the region could prove to be
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a fatal mistake in the long-term and provides permissive conditions for the rebels to act with further impunity and without pause. Seeing as the rebels have not formed part of the latest peace process, they are not necessarily bound to abide by the noble intentions and commitments other stakeholders have made. Whether the leaders in the region are genuinely committed to delivering on the peace agreement also remains to be seen. The parties will ultimately have to guard against developing vague benchmarks that would provide parties with renewed opportunities to renge on their pledges – these flaws could provide one or several parties with a convenient escape clause from the agreement! A great responsibility has been placed on the DRC to deliver on the successful outcomes of the new framework agreement. Given its dismal track record of the past, whether Kinshasa can deliver on the provision of security and peace consolidation that is required of a functioning and effective state – which the DRC has to date failed to live up to – is a major concern. The DRC has to date faltered on virtually all critical fronts required for sustainable peace, notably securing the establishment of a professional and fully functioning army. The high incidence and level of corruption, impunity for human rights violations committed, the restriction of political space, the emerging trend towards the concentration of excessive power in the hands of a few well-connected elite, and the increasing presence of authoritarian tendencies in the executive branch are likely to weaken the Kinshasa Government’s ability to deliver on yet another ambitious peace agreement. Particularly worrisome is the fact that the DRC has been charged with developing its own national oversight mechanism as part of the new peace agreement. Whether the Kinshasa government will have the necessary political will and commitment to construct such an oversight mechanism, amidst charges of its dismal track-record in the realm of transparency and good governance, could potentially hamper the framework agreement’s progress. How the implementation of the framework has progressed to date was to be reviewed during the holding of the first meeting of the follow-up mechanism of the agreement, at the level of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, on 26 May 2013.

In a press statement issued by the AU Peace and Security Council during its 371st Meeting on 25 April 2013, the body took note of and welcomed the initiatives taken as a follow-up to the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the DRC and the region, signed in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013. In this regard, the Council noted with satisfaction the decision of Presidents Jacob Zuma of South Africa, Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola and Joseph Kabila of the DRC, at their meeting held in Luanda, on 12 March 2013, to establish a “tripartite joint cooperation mechanism” to facilitate the implementation of the Framework Agreement. The Council also welcomed the renewed commitment Presidents Denis Sassou N’guesso of the Republic of Congo (as mediator), Joseph Kabila, Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, made at their meeting in Oyo, Republic of Congo, on 24 March 2013, to implement the Framework Agreement.
The Future of MONUSCO: A Mission Whose Time Has Come?

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also presented a special report to the UN Security Council outlining a proposal for a strengthened political and security role for MONUSCO – the UN’s peacekeeping operation in the DRC, which was widely criticised for failing to prevent M23 rebels from capturing the city of Goma in November 2012. The Special Report of the Secretary-General on the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, issued on 27 February 2013, highlighted important developments, in particular recommendations to address the recurring cycles of violence in the eastern DRC. Perhaps the most important development was the Secretary-General’s announcement of the establishment of a new intervention brigade. As outlined by the Secretary-General:

In support of the objectives of the Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, and following consultation with the African Union, SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which had initially conceived the idea of the deployment of a peace-enforcement force to address the threat posed by armed groups, it is proposed that a dedicated intervention brigade be established within MONUSCO for an initial period of one year. Under the direct operational command of the MONUSCO Force Commander and operating alongside other MONUSCO brigades in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the intervention brigade would have the peace-enforcement tasks of preventing the expansion of, neutralizing and disarming armed groups, to be carried out together with disarmament, demobilization and reintegation and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement efforts. The activities of the intervention brigade would be aimed at creating an environment conducive to the restoration of State authority and the achievement of sustainable stability (UN Security Council 2013,14).

In acknowledgement of the trend in North and South Kivu of armed groups returning after operations targeting them in North and South Kivu have concluded, often with the specific aim of committing violent reprisal acts against civilians, MONUSCO indicated that it would also incorporate enhanced mechanisms for the protection of civilians. The ability to successfully act against armed groups this time around will prove to be the ultimate test for MONUSCO. The Secretary-General also stressed and placed emphasis on the fact the envisioned intervention brigade should have a clear exit strategy that recognizes that the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) has the primary responsibility for safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. On 28 March 2013 the Security Council formally approved the creation of its first-ever “offensive” combat force, intended to carry out targeted operations to “neutralize and disarm” the M23 rebel group, as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC. The Council unanimously adopted resolution 2098 (2013), extending until 31 March 2014, the mandate of MONUSCO and created, on an exceptional basis, a specialized
The envisioned intervention brigade with a new peace-enforcement mandate could, however, exacerbate tensions and lead to a potential escalation in military confrontations. The objective of attempting to ultimately neutralize all armed groups could potentially backfire into a protracted struggle against numerous groups in virtually all expanses of the eastern Congo. Estimates in recent IRIN reports suggest that there are presently more than 33 armed groups operating in eastern DRC undertaking various endeavours, such as mineral extraction and self-defence (IRIN News 2013b). The UN could consequently find itself involved in a long and costly engagement, could be overrun by a determined and battle-ready rebel group seeking to secure a bruising blow against ‘external enemies’ and ultimately be engulfed in and overwhelmed by a far graver humanitarian crisis due to the increased risk of retaliatory attacks by armed groups against civilians. MONUSCO – established with the mandate of stabilization – is venturing into uncharted territory with potentially disastrous consequences if the peace enforcement mission fails.

Another significant step by the UN was the appointment, on 18 March 2013, of Mary Robinson as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, who will work closely with the governments of the region to reach agreements and establish mechanisms to guarantee non-interference in the internal affairs of the neighbouring States (UN Security Council 2013, 13). The former Irish leader and member of the illustrious Elders, expressed her hopes of a “fresh chance” to resolve underlying issues behind a cycle of violence in the DRC and outlined her vision in a document entitled “A Framework of Hope”, which reflected the newly-appointed Special Envoy’s sense of the agreement and how she could most effectively contribute to its implementation. Robinson expressed her conviction that with sustained political will, the new Framework could work. The Special Envoy delivered a briefing to Council members, following her first visit to the region in early May 2013 (SAFPI 2013).

The deployment of SADC and South Africa as part of the intervention brigade could additionally complicate the envisioned deployment. This begs the question whether SADC and South Africa will be able to contribute meaningfully to the proposed intervention, given current practical constraints.

**SADC and South Africa: Crucial Pivots for Peace…or Spent Force?**

President Jacob Zuma expressed South Africa’s commitment to the new framework agreement and its commitment to partnering with the government and people of the DRC as they respond to

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2 South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi would be the primary troop-contributing countries for this intervention brigade of 3,069 soldiers, authorized in terms of Security Council resolution 2098 of April 1, 2013
the urgent challenges of development. President Zuma expressed South Africa’s readiness to work with the DRC on important challenges such as reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction and development covering such areas as security sector reform, institutional capacity building and economic development (Zuma 2013). The new Special Envoy also praised South Africa’s role to boost its economic partnership with the DRC. South Africa welcomed the intention to review the MONUSCO mission and also welcomed the proposal for an Intervention Brigade as a realistic option to bring security to the eastern DRC within the shortest timeframe and expressed hope that the signing of the new peace framework would hasten the deployment of an appropriate peace enforcement mechanism. President Zuma, however, stressed that a military deployment presented only a short term solution, but that real stability, peace and development requires far-reaching actions from the Government of the DRC and its neighbours, and expressed the belief that only a comprehensive political solution would form the basis of lasting peace in the eastern DRC (Zuma 2013).

South Africa’s involvement in the DRC peace process has produced a mixed outcome and track-record. Its envisioned deployment to the eastern Congo – on what could be the first aggressive long-term engagement by the army since 1994 – could have negative consequences. The SADC indicated earlier in February 2013 that it required only a mandate from the UN Security Council to go ahead with the deployment of an intervention force in which SA would have a key role. The envisioned SADC contingent will number approximately 4,000 troops.

Since then South Africa was left reeling by the disastrous outcomes of its ill-fated military involvement in the Central African Republic. During its deployment 13 South African soldiers were killed during a brutal skirmish with rebel fighters who were determined to wrest control of the Central African Republic and overthrow its president, François Bozizé. President Jacob Zuma’s legacy as a peacemaker on the continent is likely to have suffered a severe blow and SA’s involvement and deployment in Central African Republic was also described as being “an unprecedented domestic and international disaster for Zuma and his administration” (Dawes 2013, 3). The ‘Zuma Doctrine’ – so dubbed by analysts to reflect a perceived departure from

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South Africa’s previous military ventures, with a more aggressive stance towards resolving the continent’s conflicts through more proactive participation in continental missions – is, however, not yet properly developed and potentially based on grandiose ambitions to secure the President accolades as an African statesman.

As a result, South Africa’s envisioned deployment to the DRC will be undertaken with far greater trepidation and fear, given its brutal experience with CAR’s rebels. The loss of further SA troops in yet another ill-conceived foreign intervention could turn the tide against South Africa’s future involvement in peacekeeping and related missions on the continent, especially where domestic opinion is concerned. The M23 rebels are also likely a force to be reckoned with and whether SADC (under SADCBrig) is genuinely prepared for a mission of such a nature and scale is questionable, given its lack of cohesion as a force. In mid-April indications began to emerge that M23 rebels could potentially attack South African forces in the DRC pre-emptively, as preparations to get battle-ready are still taking place (De Wet and Mataboge 2013b). As part of the propaganda war, M23 warned South Africa that it would not be responsible for a “mutual massacre” when attacked on its home turf and also issued a stern warning to UN forces that it would face “continuous deadly combat”. South Africa’s Munigi base (on the outskirts of Goma) could therefore face a massive onslaught and if successful the M23 rebels could score a major morale-boosting and political victory.

**Conclusion: An Agreement Already Faltering**

Recent developments do not bode well for the fledgling peace agreement. Tensions amongst the M23 leadership led to a split in late February 2013 in which the president of the movement, Jean-Marie Runiga, was dismissed by General Makenga, the military leader of the movement. Runiga left with the second strongman of the M23, General Baudoin Ngaruye and Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the International Criminal Court. This contributed towards the creation of a potentially dangerous power vacuum in key M23 strongholds. On 18 March, Ntaganda surrendered himself to the US Embassy in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, and asked to be transferred to the International Criminal Court for trial over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity – a move welcomed in the fight against impunity in the region, yet by no means adequate in itself to end violence in the region. The ICGLR peace talks in Kampala between the M23 and Kinshasa also reached a deadlock over a number of points of contention. The Kampala peace talks between M23 and the DRC government commenced in December 2012, under the auspices of the ICGLR. The talks had made little progress and had been put on hold partially due to the rebel group’s internal problems (IRIN News 2013). Not surprisingly, the M23 delegation engaged in peace talks with the Congolese government indicated that the peace process has been undermined by the proposed deployment of the UN-sanctioned intervention...
brigade (SAPA-AP 2013b). With the likelihood of peace talks indefinitely shelved, the M23 rebels have already commenced their planning for the impending clash.

Amidst emerging fault lines and signs that the peace agreement is likely to falter like many peace agreements initiated in the region prior, the rebellion is likely to persist without pause, and the agreement likely to provide only a brief respite from hostilities and a rrestive short-term peace – until one of the parties initiates a frantic search for an escape clause.

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Biographical Note
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Book Reviews

Kings M. Phiri, John McCracken and Wapulumuka O. Mulwafu (eds.)

*Malawi in Crisis: The 1959/60 Nyasaland State of Emergency and its Legacy*


Reviewed by: Harvey C.C. Banda, Mzuzu University, Malawi

*Malawi in Crisis*, a book edited by seasoned Malawian and Malawianist historians, Kings M. Phiri, John McCracken and Wapulumuka O. Mulwafu, is a vivid reconstruction of the State of Emergency that occurred in Nyasaland in 1959. The Emergency marked an epitome of the high tide of nationalism in Malawian politics. As conspicuously indicated in the title, the book also sheds light on the commemorations during the aftermath, hence ‘its legacy’. As has been rightly observed elsewhere, the 1964 Cabinet Crisis, at the onset of Dr. H.K. Banda’s reign, inadvertently ‘steals the show’ in Malawi’s political history. Such prominence is exemplified by Andrew C. Ross’ *Colonialism to Cabinet Crisis: A Political History of Malawi* (2009). Yet, in terms of significance, it is the Emergency which ought to be prominent as it shook the foundations of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and, most importantly, together with similar events ‘abroad’, provided a backdrop to the realisation of independence in British Central Africa.

*Malawi in Crisis* presents a lucid picture of the events as they unfolded largely using a case study approach. This approach, however, as expected, has its own grey areas. In this connection, John McCracken in the introduction admits the consequent loopholes: “There was nothing on the Emergency in Blantyre, by far the largest town and the hub of Malawian nationalist politics; nothing on the Lower Shire Valley, where relations between chiefs and the commoners were particularly bitter”. This gap may be filled by Kings M. Phiri’s chapter on the memories of the State of Emergency in Zomba District. Phiri rightly argues that “what was witnessed or experienced in Zomba (one of the major towns) during the State of Emergency also applied to several other districts in the country”. If I were to contribute a chapter, it would have been titled “Mzimba boma vis-à-vis the 1959 State of Emergency and its Aftermath”. Yet viewed from a different angle, the uniqueness of this book lies in the approach itself: it is a collection of the reconstruction of events in so-far clearly unfamiliar parts of Malawi. Examples abound, such as: Hendrina Kachapila Mazizwa’s succinct account of the developments in Chiwaliwali Village.

This approach, it should be appreciated, presents a bottom-up reconstruction of the past, in line with social history and unlike elite history. The other interesting case is by John Lloyd C.
Lwanda, who presents the Emergency through a musical lens. This is furthered by Bryson G. Nkhoma in the last chapter on the politics of the Emergency commemorations. The songs he cites, ‘Zivute zitani, ife Amalawi, tili pammbuyo pa Kamuzu!’, for example, remind the reader of the rootedness and the impact of political propaganda, which was, on the whole, part of the process of indoctrinating the youth in post-colonial Malawi. All this is part of the Emergency-legacy equation. The other strength of Malawi in Crisis is seen from the chapters on ‘Central African Interconnections’ as, in this way, the Emergency can better be understood as part of the broader picture, that is, within the Federation discourse.

There are several cross-cutting themes, some of which ought to have come out clearly, or, put differently, ought to have gained more prominence in the book. One example is the nationalism-politics-security nexus. This is one of the overarching themes of the Emergency. The high tide of nationalism resulted in the declaration of the State of Emergency (here the colonial government had no alternative) and this had resounding repercussions on the human insecurity of Malawians. However, the effect in question was ambivalent: on the one hand, it instilled fear on Malawians, hence they ran helter-skelter; and yet, on the other hand, it filled them with unprecedented zeal as they were more determined (than before) to clash with the state machinery, unarmed, and, in some cases, poorly armed as they were. This is appropriately and imaginatively depicted by the cover photo: security personnel armed with guns; whereas the citizenry are armed with clubs! Is this not reminiscent of the Goliath-David scenario in the Bible?

On the whole, Malawi in Crisis, which presents cutting-edge research and analysis on the 1959/1960 State of Emergency, has been published at the right time – when there is a cry (amongst Malawians) for history books by full-fledged and real time historians. Most of the books published on Malawi's history have, in earnest, been merely compiled by scholars, whose powers to analyse issues, itself a pillar in the process of reconstructing the historical past, are, candidly-speaking, in doubt. This book is, therefore, a must read for teachers and students, alike, and would serve as an effective academic reference at both college and university level.

Marcus Power and Ana Cristina Alves (eds.)

China and Angola – A marriage of convenience?


Reviewed by: Just Castillo Iglesias, Osaka University, Japan

This volume, compiled by Power and Alves, resulting from a conference on Sino-Angolan relations that took place in 2011 in Luanda, presents a complete and well-analysed overview of the China-Angola partnership in-the-making, discussing the different aspects of these complex and multi-layered relations. While some of the issues dealt with in the volume are fairly familiar within the debate of Sino-African relations, which has gained a strong presence in academic and public debates over the last decade, this work helps demystify some of the pre-established
assumptions that surround this debate, and that often present a view in which China is the main party that has benefited from these bilateral exchanges, and in which the strategic implications that China’s involvement has for African governments and development is underestimated.

Since the end of its armed conflict, Angola has rapidly become one of China’s key oil partners, and their bilateral relations have since undergone substantial processes of change and transformation. The volume effectively presents how the Angolan elites have managed to anchor the partnership with China to national reconstruction and infrastructure development – much needed in the country after the 30-year-long civil war – in a context in which Western donors and markets have been unwilling to fund such projects. This, in turn has fitted well with their strategy for regime survival and stability. On the other hand, the book provides evidence of how, in contrast to many common assumptions present in the Sino-African relations debate, Angolan elites have been fierce in maintaining their sovereignty and bargaining power, and have managed to turn China’s interest into a mutually beneficial exchange, keeping the door open to partnerships with other countries and protecting the interests of the domestic enterprises, rather than as a one-sided or unbalanced partnership in which China would be the main benefiting party.

This volume is thus a comprehensive monograph on this multifaceted partnership. It contains nine articles by different African, Portuguese and Chinese scholars. In the first two chapters, Alden and Malaquias, respectively, offer a detailed introduction to the formation and historical development of the Sino-Angolan partnership to date, contextualizing it in the growing Chinese interest in Africa’s resources, debating how through its cash-for-oil loans China has become a fully-fledged alternative to partnerships with Western governments for Angola, and how change and constant adaptation are the dominant trend in the bilateral relations.

In chapter 3, one of the most insightful articles in the volume, Corkin describes how the Angolan elites have managed the Chinese oil-backed loans, yet how Chinese oil companies have not been awarded privileged treatment in comparison to others, particularly considering the deficits in exploitation technology that are necessary to extract oil from the country’s deep wells. Corkin illustrates as well how due to Angolan elites’ bid to diversity the country’s finance partners, Chinese companies do not regard this country as a strategic location for their FDI beyond the ongoing contracts in the oil industry. Nevertheless, the Chinese Exim Bank has successfully managed to increase the presence of Chinese construction companies in the Angolan market amidst competition from international and other Chinese actors. In a similar direction, Fernandes discusses in chapter 4 how the influx of Chinese investments and activity in Angola have been generally praised and seen positively, how these are a significant milestone towards the country’s rehabilitation, yet also drawing attention to the negative perceptions triggered by the influx of Chinese manpower and Chinese recruitment policies, which are more often than not unwilling to employ predominantly local workforce.

Chapters 5 and 6 continue with the analysis of the different aspects of the oil partnership. In chapter 5, Weimer and Vines re-examine the context in which the Chinese cooperation with Angola started to develop, and deconstruct the common myth that overemphasizes Chinese
influence in Angola's affairs, often present among Western voices, by arguing how the Angolan government has maintained a strategy of reinforcing bilateral political and commercial relations with third countries.

In the last part, composed of chapters 7 to 9, the authors evaluate the opportunities and challenges that the relationship with China poses to Angola, and argue in favour of consolidating domestic national institutions in order to continue maximizing Angolan benefits from this relationship – beyond the initial phase in which Chinese funds have efficiently delivered the needed infrastructure to bridge the negative legacy of the conflict. In these last chapters, the authors contribute with a detailed insight on the local perceptions of the impact of Chinese activities in local manpower and the labour market, debating that frequent negative perceptions among the local population are not only generated by the (often disrespectful) pre-agreed quotas of local workers in Chinese-led constructions, but also questioning the quality of the infrastructure developed and examining the role of Chinese micro-business and private entrepreneurs that escape the oversight of the Chinese government. Among the concluding remarks, the authors call for enhancing mutual knowledge and trust in order to boost all the potentialities of this incipient partnership.

Although some of the aspects reviewed are rather familiar within the debate of China’s approach to Africa, the volume leaves the reader with a comprehensive picture of the complex, multi-layered, interconnected and sometimes conflicting interests between China and Angola. The authors, in some cases brilliantly, manage to shed some light towards the opaque and complex network of actors and interests that shape this marriage of convenience that is Sino-Angolan relations. Definitely, a recommended read for anyone with an interest on China, Angola or Sino-African relations.

Theo Neethling and Heidi Hudson (eds.)  
*Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa: Concepts, Role-Players, Policy and Practice*

Reviewed by: Hussein Solomon, University of the Free State, South Africa

Almost half of all peace agreements fail within the first five years of implementation, Heidi Hudson reminds us in her introduction to this thought-provoking book. Why is this so? One major reason for this tragic failure lies in the poor implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) programmes on the African continent, despite the African Union adopting it as a priority area of its peace and security agenda in 2006. PCRD also features prominently in the aims of the United Nations as it moves away from traditional peacekeeping missions and embraces broader mandates relating to governance and development.
In the process, peace-building requires a broader range of tasks which, in turn, requires that militaries be re-trained and equipped accordingly. This is urgently needed since, as Maxi Schoeman points out in this volume, whilst soldiers’ baseline training is combat-oriented – focusing on conventional warfare – the tasks they are now required to fulfil are far more complex than they were trained for. This shortcoming is acknowledged by the Chief of the South African Army, General Masondo who wrote the foreword to this book,

… the operationalization of PCRD in Africa requires holistic rethinking of all concepts and strategies currently being developed. Military organisations should be reorganised, prepared and equipped to contribute to PCRD by providing basic services and laying the foundations for sustainable development. This, in turn, demands a reassessment of the strategies, force design, force structure and capabilities/resources of the 21st-century African military organisations.

The book aims to provide the reader with penetrating perspectives of academics and practitioners on the role of the military and the interfaces and cooperation requirements among militaries, non-governmental organisations, international actors and local stakeholders in PCRD. There are many reasons that make this volume unique in the vast literature on PCRD. First, it is a publication on Africa emanating from Africa. This is especially evident in the chapter by Peter Deane-Baker which introduces readers to notions of African ethics underpinning the continent’s prioritizing of PCRD. Second, it provides the most diverse engagement by scholars, soldiers and non-governmental personnel on the subject of PCRD. This rich diversity of views is reinforced by the approach adopted by the editors as outlined in the introduction:

With this project we do not wish to promote a consensus position on PCRD in Africa. In fact, we are quite comfortable with offering a diversity of scholarly perspectives on the topic, ranging from those who question the idea of liberal peacebuilding (Seegers and Hudson) to those accept liberal peacebuilding but who want to reform it from within (De Coning, Baker, Murithi and Heinecken).

This approach also serves to render the book infinitely more readable as there is a sense of a debate between the authors of the respective chapters, keeping the readers’ interest. The third reason which makes this volume unique is its scope – from uncovering PCRD’s conceptual roots to its critical examination of role-players in the African context to its interrogation of policy and practice. Fourth, is the amazing ease with which this volume moves from theoretical debates to policy recommendations as well as responding to dilemmas of PCRD at each level of analysis. For instance, Lindy Heinecken, in her excellent contribution, convincingly argues that gender-neutral approaches to PCRD are fundamentally flawed, as war and peace affect men and women differently. Immediately following Heinecken’s chapter is Theo Neethling’s penetrating study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Here he examines PCRD from the perspective of state-building, security sector reform and humanitarian conditions.
At the same time, there are some shortcomings of the study. First, whilst purporting to be an African study, it is overwhelmingly written by South Africans. Surely, other scholars elsewhere on the continent, and especially those in countries which have experienced PCRD, will have a different perspective from their South African counterparts. Second, I believe that the volume would have been greatly enhanced with specific chapters focusing on the role of the sub-regional security institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It is in these institutions, after all, that the regional brigades are located and it is forces from these institutions that are deployed in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. Third, given the growing importance of hybrid peacekeeping in the form of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as the United Nations-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), it would have been prudent for the editors to have also included hybrid peace missions from the perspective of PCRD.

At the same time, the volume is very comprehensive as it is. Perhaps, the shortcomings mentioned above should be the subject of a second volume.